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BETWEEN SAVIORS AND SAVAGES: THE EFFECT OF
TURKEY’S REVISED PENAL CODE ON THE
TRANSFORMATION OF HONOR KILLINGS INTO HONOR
SUICIDES AND WHY COMMUNITY DISCOURSE IS
NECESSARY FOR HONOR CRIME ERADICATION
Bethany A. Corbin∗
INTRODUCTION
Ka thought it strangely depressing that the suicide girls had to
struggle to find a private moment to kill themselves. Even after
swallowing their pills, even as they lay quietly dying, they’d had to
share their rooms with others.1

The savage phrase contained in a simple text message haunted Derya’s
mind.2 Her moment of freedom and independence sparked by unpermitted love
shattered instantly, replaced with all-consuming shame and fear. Derya knew
the risks that accompanied her forbidden acts—her own aunt had been
murdered by her grandfather for seeing a boy.3 Yet, Derya defied her family’s
orders and refused to heed her mother’s death warnings. As she flirted with
danger, news of her love affair spread, and at age seventeen she received a
devastating order from her uncle: “You have blackened our name,” the text
message read.4 “Kill yourself and clean our shame, or we will kill you first.”5

∗

J.D., Wake Forest University School of Law, 2013; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
2011. I wish to thank Dr. Banu Gökariksel, Associate Professor of Geography at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, for introducing me to the topic of honor killings and sparking my interest in
worldwide domestic violence research. Thank you for being a mentor on this topic for the last four years.
1 ORHAN PAMUK, SNOW 24 (Maureen Freely Trans., Everyman’s Library 2004) (2011).
2 Derya’s story is adapted from online news articles. See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky, How to Avoid Honor
Killing in Turkey? Honor Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/world/
europe/16turkey.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&; Jan Goodwin, Honor Suicides in Turkey, MARIE CLAIRE (May
25, 2007), http://www.marieclaire.com/world-reports/news/turkey-women; Lee Habeeb, The Real War on
Women, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 26, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/296958/realwar-women-lee-habeeb.
3 Bilefsky, supra note 2.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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This severe and inhumane sanction from her family arose from one simple
action—Derya had fallen in love with Recep, a high school classmate.6 Having
never experienced love, Derya clung tightly to her new romance, talking with
Recep daily on the phone. When Derya’s uncle learned of the communication,
he confiscated her phone and alerted her family. But Derya couldn’t stop. She
borrowed a friend’s phone and continued the relationship, angry about her
family’s strict requirements.7 As the romance progressed, Derya faced
increasing violence at home, until one day she received a message instructing
her to never return home again and to kill herself.
These threatening messages arrived fifteen times per day and served as a
death sentence.8 “My family attacked my personality, and I felt I had
committed the biggest sin in the world,” Derya confided.9 “I felt I had no right
to dishonor my family, that I have no right to be alive. So I decided to respect
my family’s desire and to die.”10 The overpowering shame and guilt forced
Derya to jump into the Tigris River in an effort to commit suicide.11 But the
attempt failed and she survived. Determined to fulfill her family’s wishes,
Derya next tried to hang herself; an uncle saved her life.12 Finally, Derya
slashed her wrists with a kitchen knife.13
Although Derya ultimately survived her three suicide attempts, her story
illuminates a developing and frightening trend in Turkey—the emergence of
honor suicides as an alternative to honor killings.14 Described broadly as
“honor crimes,” both honor killings and honor suicides are rooted in
patriarchal orders based on the authority of men.15 Perceived as unquestionably
horrific forms of violence, honor crimes occur when a family member has

6

Goodwin, supra note 2.
Derya was particularly upset over the loss of her cell phone privilege, stating, “Part of me was angry.
Everyone uses cell phones. Why not me?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Bilefsky, supra note 2; Goodwin, supra note 2.
9 Bilefsky, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11 Id.; Goodwin, supra note 2 (explaining that in June 2006, “Derya threw herself into the fast-flowing
Tigris River near the Iraqi border, but a passing police patrol pulled her out”).
12 Bilefsky, supra note 2; Goodwin, supra note 2. Derya attempted to hang herself by attaching a rope to
a ceiling hook that was meant to hold a baby’s cradle. Goodwin, supra note 2. When Derya pushed the chair
out from beneath her legs, her uncle heard the crash and cut her down. Id.
13 Bilefsky, supra note 2; Goodwin, supra note 2; Habeeb, supra note 2.
14 Goodwin, supra note 2.
15 See John A. Cohan, Honor Killings and Cultural Defense, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 177, 191 (2010); see
also Necla Mora, Violence as a Communicative Action: Customary and Honor Killings, 6 INT’L J. HUM. SCI.
499, 506 (2009).
7
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violated a social or moral norm that brings shame and dishonor to the family.16
Frequently, the norm violated is sexual in nature and the scope of acts that can
trigger an honor killing or suicide is vast.17 Because women are seen as
“symbolic bearers of the honor of the clan or tribe,” this sexual contamination
is typically punished by murder in order to regain social status.18
Recently, however, scholars and journalists have identified a shift away
from honor killings—in which a male family member murders his own kin—to
honor suicides—in which the female transgressor is forced to take her own
life.19 This alleged transformation has been widely attributed to the adoption of
Turkey’s revised Penal Code in late 2004, which mandated harsh criminal
sentences for both the honor killing perpetrator and family members who
encouraged the killing.20 Faced with this new prospect of imprisonment,
scholars have argued that honor killings have undergone a metamorphosis into
honor suicides to prevent the clan from losing two family members.21 This
causal connection between honor suicides and the revised Turkish Penal Code
was widely espoused in Turkish media and honor killing scholarship.
This Article, however, disputes the causal linkage of honor suicides with
Turkey’s new Penal Code, and argues that the existence of honor suicides has
simply garnered increased media attention since 2004. In particular, this
Article asserts that the statistical data is insufficient to support an association
between harsher criminal punishments and honor suicides. Rather, scholars
have used the revised Penal Code as a scapegoat to avoid addressing the
problematic aspects of Turkey’s underlying honor culture. As one of the first
articles to provide an in-depth analysis and critique of this causal connection,
this Article challenges the conclusory statements of scholars and the press, and
advances the position that honor suicides existed within Turkey prior to the
adoption of the revised Penal Code.
In support of this argument, this Article is divided into six parts. Part I
offers an overview and description of honor killings, defines the concept of
16 See Hilal O. Ince et al., Customary Killings in Turkey and Turkish Modernization, 45 MIDDLE E. STUD.
537, 538 (2009).
17 See, e.g., Bilefsky, supra note 2.
18 Cynthia F. Epstein, Death by Gender, 57 DISSENT 54, 54 (2010).
19 See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 2.
20 See Sezgin Cihangir, Gender Specific Honor Codes and Cultural Change, 16 GROUP PROCESS
INTERGROUP REL. 319, 322 (2013).
21 See id.; Helena Smith, When Wrong Boyfriends or Clothes Lead Daughters to Kill Themselves, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/23/turkey.gender.
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honor within Turkish society, and answers the pressing question of whether
Islam condones these crimes. Part II narrows the focus of this Article solely to
honor killings within Turkey’s borders, and analyzes honor killing perception
within Turkey. Specifically, Part II highlights the ethnicization of honor
killings as a Kurdish phenomenon and discusses the motivations behind this
depiction. The section then transitions into an exploration of how Turkey’s bid
for European Union (“EU”) accession forced Turkey to adopt harsher criminal
sanctions against honor killing perpetrators. Part III advances this analysis by
identifying the key honor killing legislation in both the unrevised and revised
Penal Codes. With the stage appropriately set, Part IV provides a critique of
the linkage between honor suicides and the revised Turkish Penal Code, and
argues that the emergence of honor suicides is not causally related to Turkey’s
legal reformation. In fact, Part V details why legal revision has been
ineffective in appreciably reducing honor crimes, and why a dialogue of
cultural discourse is fundamental to the eradication of both honor killings and
honor suicides. Finally, Part VI concludes the Article.
I. DEFINING HONOR KILLINGS
The term “honor killing” refers to the organized murder of a family
member—typically female—for bringing perceived shame and dishonor to her
family or community.22 Committed by fathers against daughters and brothers
against sisters, honor killings are the result of carefully debated plans by a
family council in which the youngest male is elected to perform the murder.23
Lacking spontaneity, these crimes adhere to a rigid organizational structure
that differentiates honor killings from the larger worldwide phenomenon of
femicide.24 Specifically, honor killings are a form of “internal, societal
violence that goes beyond families”25 and arises from the prerogative to avoid
social ostracism.26 These murders transcend the bounds of the family home and
22 See Tenzin Dorjee et al., A Social Ecological Perspective on Understanding “Honor Killing”: An
Intercultural Moral Dilemma, 42 J. INTERCULTURAL COMM. RES. 1, 3 (2013) (“[H]onor killing is defined here
as one that involves killing or murdering a female family member by her own family members and family
friends to avenge shame brought by infidelity or other culturally unacceptable behaviors.”).
23 Recep Doğan, Is Honor Killing a “Muslim Phenomenon”? Textual Interpretations and Cultural
Representations, 31 J. MUSLIM MINORITY AFF. 423, 423 (2011).
24 See AYSE ONAL, HONOUR KILLING: STORIES OF MEN WHO KILLED 10 (2008) (discussing the
difference between honor killings and domestic violence); Doğan, supra note 23, at 423 (“Honor killing is the
product of social interactions amongst members of society; and it is qualitatively different from other kinds of
murders.”).
25 ONAL, supra note 24, at 255.
26 See id. at 26.

CORBIN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

11/18/2014 11:18 AM

BETWEEN SAVIORS AND SAVAGES

281

represent an extreme form of revenge that becomes mandatory when no
alternative exists for restoring family honor. In this manner, honor killings can
be perceived as the failure of a family to adequately control the sexual
behavior of its female members.27 This section provides a pertinent explanation
of honor and the characteristics of honor killings, serving as the foundation for
the discussion of Turkish honor killings and the revised Turkish Penal Code.
A. What is Honor?
The elusive and dynamic term “honor” represents virtue, on the one hand,
and hierarchical dominance on the other.28 Operating worldwide as a form of
social currency, honor functions informally as property29 and serves as a
“cornerstone in the construction of gender identity.”30 Although the precise
definition of honor differs from region to region and culture to culture, honor
has remained a fundamental property of human beings for centuries. Typically
viewed as a measure of social prestige within the community, honor is an
acquired and earned trait subject to constant defense and loss.31
The “Western” notion of honor is customarily defined in terms of integrity
and virtuous behavior.32 It is an achieved status, increasing or decreasing with
the owner’s accomplishments and actions.33 In Turkey, this form of honor is
specifically denoted seref, and is possessed and controlled exclusively by men
as a marker of social worth and reputation.34 Remaining independent from the
actions of females, seref is not implicated in the honor killing analysis, but
rather stands in stark contrast to its counterpart, namus.
Namus, which creates the foundation for Turkish honor killings, represents
a form of sexual honor “that presupposes physical and moral qualities that

27

See Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, The Role of ‘Community Discourse’ in Combating ‘Crimes of Honour’:
Preliminary Assessment and Prospects, in ‘HONOUR’ CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
65, 67 (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005).
28 Alina Zvinkliene, ‘Honour Killings’ in Modern Societies: A Sociological Perspective, 1 ISLAM &
CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL 532, 532 (2010).
29 Johanna Bond, Honor as Property, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 202, 202 (2012).
30 Zvinkliene, supra note 28, at 532.
31 See Cohan, supra note 15, at 181–83.
32 Aysan Sev’er & Gökçeçiçek Yurdakul, Culture of Honor, Culture of Change: A Feminist Analysis of
Honor Killings in Rural Turkey, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 964, 971 (2001) (defining honor as “moral
integrity, the esteem accorded to virtue or talent”).
33 See id. at 972.
34 KATHERINE PRATT EWING, STOLEN HONOR: STIGMATIZING MUSLIM MEN IN BERLIN 32 (2008); Sev’er
& Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 972.
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women ought to have.”35 Reflecting on the whole family, namus refers directly
to the sexual purity of females and stresses traditional gender roles in which
women are expected to assume and accept subordinate social positions.36
Structured as a gender-specific code of honor, namus requires females to
maintain their family’s social reputation through sexual purity and creates a
preoccupation with women’s chastity.37 In this sense, honor is located solely
within the female body and controlled through the female’s actions.38 Men
possess no namus of their own, and women carry the heavy “burden of
safeguarding group identity and group honor.”39
While men cannot directly claim namus, they are fundamentally impacted
by any loss of female virtue.40 A wrong decision related to female honor
inevitably humiliates the entire family on a communal level and disgraces the
male kin. Because honor serves as the barometer of familial worth, the male
family members actively strive to control the female’s namus by restricting her
sexual behavior.41 This male domination of female sexuality operates on a
community-wide level and leads to the development of extreme sanctions
aimed at controlling the sexual behavior of women.42 In this manner, women
serve as the agents of men when it comes to their sexuality and are perceived
35 AYSAN SEV’ER, PATRIARCHAL MURDERS OF WOMEN: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF HONOUR-BASED
KILLINGS IN TURKEY AND IN THE WEST 115 (2013); Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 973.
36 KARL A. ROBERTS ET AL., HONOR-BASED VIOLENCE: POLICING AND PREVENTION 19 (2014) (“[H]onor
cultures can be described as stressing ‘traditional’ gender roles in which there is high inequality between the
genders. Males have most of the political power and females are expected to maintain subordinate social
positions . . . .”); Yvette van Osch et al., A Different Kind of Honor Culture: Family Honor and Aggression in
Turks, 16 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 334, 335 (2013); see JAN GOODWIN, PRICE OF HONOR:
MUSLIM WOMEN LIFT THE VEIL OF SILENCE ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD 8 (2003) (noting that “[t]he honor of the
Muslim family is believed to reside in a woman’s chastity and modesty”).
37 Cihangir, supra note 20, at 321; Gul Ozyegin, Virginal Facades: Sexual Freedom and Guilt among
Young Turkish Women, 16 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 103, 111 (2009); see Purna Sen, ‘Crimes of Honour’,
Value and Meaning, in ‘HONOUR’ CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 42, 51 (Lynn
Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005) (“The honour code thus reflects and contributes to socially legitimated
constructions of gender norms that shape and reflect behaviours and are not separate from these.”).
38 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Preface to the ‘HONOUR’ CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN xi, xi (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005); ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 36, at 22.
39 Ozyegin, supra note 37, at 111; see UNNI WIKAN, IN HONOR OF FADIME: MURDER AND SHAME 86
(Anna Paterson trans., 2003) (noting that women “represent honor; they symbolize honor; they are honor”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 973 (explaining that namus is always
determined by female family members).
40 Cohan, supra note 15, at 187 (“In part, the modesty code is derived from the idea that men can become
contaminated or defiled by women.”).
41 See id. (“The honor of the village group lies with the modesty of its women and the readiness of its
men to protect this modesty.”).
42 Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 975–76.
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solely as producers of shame.43 Thus, honor killings are premised on what has
been popularized as the honor-shame complex—“the aggressor’s sense of
identity or failing is based on the behavior of another.”44 In this complex,
honor is seen through the lens of the “West” as a motive which propels men to
kill for reasons that are perceived as petty, unreasonable, or backward.45
Therefore, for an honor killing to occur, there must first be a loss of female
honor and acquisition of shame upon the family.
B. The Characteristics of Honor Killings
Honor codes—and the crimes associated with them—are not solely
concerned with individual men controlling individual women. Rather, honor
crimes “are about community norms, social policing and collective decisions
and acts of punishment.”46 Killing based on shame and tainted honor occurs
within a family structure where the bonds of affection, love, and obedience
bind all participants to the murder.47 Created as the product of social
interactions among societal members, “[h]onor killings are a recurrent form of
[domestic and] intra-familial violence, finding vindication and acceptance in
society and the law.”48 Once rumors of a female’s transgressions spread
throughout the community, killing the offending female is an obligation of the
disgraced family, and the only means of restoring lost honor.49 Therefore,
honor killing can be defined as the deliberate murder of a disobedient or
shameful family member by a familial council for the sole purpose of
absolving the family’s honor.

43 See Aisha K. Gill, Feminist Reflections on Researching So-called ‘Honor’ Killings, 21 FEMINIST
LEGAL STUD. 241, 243 (2013) (“[M]en are responsible for acquiring honour for their families, while women
are seen as potential producers of shame.”).
44 Nancy V. Baker et al., Family Killing Fields: Honor Rationales in the Murder of Women, 5 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 164, 177 (1999); see EWING, supra note 34, at 29–30 (discussing the honor-shame
complex).
45 Sen, supra note 37, at 45.
46 Id. at 48.
47 Shahrzad Mojab & Amir Hassanpour, In Memory of Fadime Sahindal: Thoughts on the Struggle
Against “Honor Killing”, KURDISH WOMEN ACTION AGAINST HONOR KILLING (Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.
kwahk.org/articles.asp?id=30.
48 Rachel A. Ruane, Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence against Women in Jordan and Pakistan, 14
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1523, 1530 (2000).
49 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, PAKISTAN (2002); see Susanne J. Prochazka, There is No Honor in Honor
Killings: Why Women At Risk for Defying Sociosexual Norms Must be Considered a “Particular Social
Group” Under Asylum Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 445, 447 (2012) (mentioning that honor killings
“allegedly wash away the shame with blood and restore the tarnished honor.”).
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Although honor killings are unquestionably related to domestic violence,
they nonetheless represent an extreme form of femicide uniquely differentiated
by five characteristics. First, honor killings involve gender relations and
interactions designed solely to control women’s behavior and sexuality.50 As
symbols of reproduction, women help to create allegiances between male
groups that enable the family to strengthen its economic connections within the
community.51 In this context, a woman is often exchanged for marriage to
improve social standing or increase familial wealth. According to Nicole Pope,
“[a] woman is just a commodity and her ‘owners’, her male relatives, have the
right to make decisions on her behalf without consulting her.”52 This view of
women remains deeply entrenched in tribal culture, and any impurity in the
woman substantially decreases her value to the family.53 If fact, because the
morality surrounding females is so strict, the male relatives tend to distort
reality and blame women for actions beyond their control—for example,
rape.54 Because of this, the female’s behavior is constantly monitored and
restricted throughout her life, particularly with arranged marriages and the
prohibition on premarital sex.55
Second, not only do males assume an active role in the regulation of female
behavior, but other women within the family partake and assist in monitoring
the subordinate females of the household.56 Within the hierarchical family, the
eldest mother or wife commands the greatest authority and respect among

50 Canan Arin, Femicide in the Name of Honor in Turkey, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 821, 822
(2001); Anand Kirti et al., The Face of Honour Based Crimes: Global Concerns and Solutions, 6 INT’L J.
CRIM. JUST. SCI. 343, 353 (2011).
51 Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Researching Women’s Victimisation in Palestine: A Socio-Legal
Analysis, in ‘HONOUR’ CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 160, 162 (Lynn Welchman &
Sara Hossain eds., 2005).
52 Nicole Pope, Honour Killings: Instruments of Patriarchal Control, in VIOLENCE IN THE NAME OF
HONOUR: THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 101, 102 (Shahrzad Mojab & Nahla Abdo eds., 2004);
see Arin, supra note 50, at 823 (“In this traditional system, women are not considered individuals; they are the
property of the family and are seen to represent its reputation or honor, and, like other forms of property, they
can be bought and sold.”).
53 See Valerie Plant, Honor Killings and the Asylum Gender Gap, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 109,
111 (2005) (“In many cultures, an individual’s identity is closely tied to their family unit. In such a culture, the
family’s honor is viewed as a personal reflection on each member of the family.”).
54 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 538.
55 Diana Y. Vitoshka, The Modern Face of Honor Killing: Factors, Legal Issues, and Policy
Recommendations, 22 BERKELEY UNDERGRADUATE J. 1, 6 (2010).
56 Plant, supra note 53, at 112 (stating that women are often involved in the act and decision to kill); see
Ince et al., supra note 16, at 548.
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other women.57 It is this female figure who actively supervises the younger
women to ensure they do not tarnish the family’s honor.58 Any help to defend
the improper actions of younger female relatives disappears immediately if it
conflicts with the eldest woman’s loyalty towards men.59 While loyalty
between women can potentially save lives, it is quite common for mothers to
be blamed for the transgressions of daughters, which gives them a vested
interest in the behavior of their family members.60 Thus, women within a
family are often vigilant and conscientious of the actions of all female
members, and are prone to turn against one another.61 In this manner, women
help to participate in the honor killing process.
Third, because of the involvement of both males and females in the
regulation of honor, the decision to pursue an honor killing results from a
collective family meeting.62 Honor crimes are not the result of spontaneous
male anger or passion, but rather occur with the collective agreement of all
family council members and a well-defined plan.63 At a minimum, the family
council consists of “the father and brother[s] of the victim, and may also
include uncles, grandfathers, male in-laws, and the mother.”64 In this way,
honor killings cannot be reduced to the psychological imbalances of the
individual killer, since the final decision belongs to the collective family as a
whole.
Fourth, given the considerable deliberation, discussion, and planning
among family members before an honor crime occurs, the council typically
elects the youngest male to perform the killing. The young age of the
57 NICOLE POPE, HONOR KILLINGS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 103 (Palgrave Macmillan 1st ed.
2012) (“Imposing matriarchs may rule over the younger generation with an iron fist, often making life a
misery for their daughters-in-law . . . .”).
58 Asa Elden, Men’s Violence and Women’s Responsibility: Mothers’ Stories about Honour Violence, in
HONOUR, VIOLENCE, WOMEN AND ISLAM 128, 133–34 (Mohammad M. Idriss & Tahir Abbas eds., 2011).
59 Id. at 134.
60 Id. at 130–34.
61 Id. at 130 (“Mothers are thus described as active in, and directly or indirectly responsible for, the
violence to which young women are exposed.”).
62 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 538; Katie L. Zaunbrecher, Comment, When Culture Hurts: Dispelling the
Myth of Cultural Justification for Gender-Based Human Rights Violations, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 679, 700
(2011).
63 Kenneth Lasson, Bloodstains on a “Code of Honor”: The Murderous Marginalization of Women in
the Islamic World, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 407, 415 (2009); see Veena Meetoo & Heidi S. Mirza, “There is
Nothing ‘Honourable’ about Honour Killings”: Gender, Violence and the Limits of Multiculturalism, 30
WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 187 (2007) (noting that other family members participate in honor killings beyond
just the husband or partner).
64 Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 965.
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perpetrator elicits the sympathy of the courts in case of a criminal trial, and
results in a reduced sentence or acquittal.65 These sentence reductions evidence
state complicity in honor killings by legitimating shame as an acceptable
motive for murder. When the perpetrators defend their actions in court, they
repeatedly reference culture and tradition as excuses mandating leniency.66 By
accepting these defenses and invoking culture as justification for killing, the
state inherently relinquishes its role as the only source of law in society. In
Southeastern Turkey, for example, the average sentence for an honor killing
was just 19.7 years in prison during 1990–2005, with a 24% acquittal rate.67
Clans are thus able to exert their own moral codes and visions into social
practice when they are confident the state will not interfere. Therefore, the
election of the youngest male to perform the murder is a strategic decision
designed to manipulate the judicial process.68
Finally, there is always an ability to regain honor through a successful
killing. Although less drastic alternatives to murder exist when faced with
perceived shame, the only purpose of an honor killing is to restore the family’s
honor and reputation.69 Hence, honor killings are only performed when the
family risks unquestionable social ostracism or embarrassment that cannot be
mitigated through punishing the offending female in another manner.70 When
faced with an accusation of impropriety, the balance of power shifts
dramatically between clans and families and places the burden of proof on the
female and her natal family to disprove the allegations.71 No benefit of the
doubt is given to the female, and when the gossip becomes public knowledge,
violence typically ensues.72 With the introduction of shame into the equation,
65 Efsa Kuraner, Celebrations of Love: Women Denounce Honor Killings in Turkey, 32 OFF OUR BACKS
28 (2002) (“The task is usually relegated to a minor male member of the family as he can benefit from the
circumstances of underage.”); Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 985. For an in-depth discussion of
sentences imposed by the Turkish courts for honor killings, see Ceren Belge, Whose Law?: Clans, Honor
Killings, and State-Minority Relations in Turkey and Israel (Jan. 1, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Washington) (on file with the University of Washington library).
66 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 538 (“The killers in customary killings widely use traditions, customs,
values and beliefs, as well as the term ‘honour’ itself, as their legitimating referents.”).
67 Belge, supra note 65, at 55.
68 See Ince et al., supra note 16, at 545 (discussing that “being under the full legal age was another reason
for a reduced sentence in customary killings”).
69 Mora, supra note 15, at 507 (“Family members, who become a target of any insult, gossip, or rumor
especially on women, perceive this condition as a stain that needs to be cleaned.”).
70 See Dorjee et al., supra note 22, at 6 (“Honor killings are the extreme manifestations of these
communal face desires, and facework strategies are often needed to recoup damaged family shame and
community honor.”).
71 Belge, supra note 65, at 173.
72 Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 14.
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the transgression becomes the concern of the entire community, not just the
victim’s immediate family.73 The harm to a female’s reputation can only be
repaired with murder, and the killer is praised for his actions.74 No sympathy is
displayed towards the female transgressor who has paid for the family’s honor
with her life.75 Thus, males are often perceived as victims of their own
circumstances while the female is simply disposable property used to increase
the family’s standing within the community.76
Therefore, while honor killings remain part of the worldwide spectrum of
domestic violence, they are particularized and distinct murders that occur on a
societal level as the result of a collective family vote. The killing buries both
the victim and her disgrace, and erases the basic human right to life.77 Despite
these distinctions, however, it is important to remember that femicide is not
particular to one culture or religious group. Women experience universal and
place-based violence that cuts across race, religion, and class.78 Although
honor killings are an unquestionably heinous crime on the spectrum of
violence, we must also raise issue with domestic violence within our own
borders.79 Focusing on culturally specific forms of violence is perceived as
controversial ground,80 and this Article in no way attempts to stereotype any
group or space as backward or barbaric.
C. The Role of Islam in Honor Killings
The uniqueness of honor killings arises not solely from the five
characteristics discussed above, but also from its developed association with a
particular religion—Islam. A common misconception exists among the
“Western” part of the world that honor killings occur solely in Islamic nations
73

Meetoo & Mirza, supra note 63, at 189.
Ince et al., supra note 16, at 538 (“The family and their social environment do not perceive customary
killings as a crime, since they view them as the only way of regaining lost honour.”); Plant, supra note 53, at
112 (“In cultures in which honor killings take place, the family members of the offending woman typically see
her slaughter as the only solution to the taint on their family honor.”); see Gill, supra note 43, at 249
(describing that the community views the killer as heroic).
75 Plant, supra note 53, at 112.
76 Gill, supra note 43, at 249; see Anushree Tripathi & Supriya Yadav, For the Sake of Honour: But
Whose Honour? “Honour Crimes” Against Women, 2 ASIA-PACIFIC J. HUMAN RTS. & L. 63, 65 (2004)
(noting that women in honor societies are seen as commodities, “not human beings endowed with dignity and
right equal to those of men”).
77 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, supra note 51, at 168.
78 Meetoo & Mirza, supra note 63, at 188.
79 Id.
80 Id.
74
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and are therefore justified under Islamic law (Sharia).81 Relevant literature and
popular news culture provide an overwhelming perception that honor killings
are ubiquitous in Islamic and Arab countries, and portray the crime as a
uniquely Muslim phenomenon.82 Honor-related violence has thus been
advertised—especially post-9/11—as being supported by Islamic scriptures
and the Qur’an (also spelled Kuran).83
While honor killings occur disproportionately in Muslim societies, the
crime is not limited to these communities and finds no support in the Qur’an or
Sharia.84 Honor killings are prevalent in religious affiliations across Africa,
South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.85 Sikhs and
Hindus specifically have been faulted for their recent involvement in honor
crimes, particularly in India, and the victims can be and sometimes are
Christians.86 A study performed by National Geographic even showed frequent
honor killings in Great Britain, Brazil, Ecuador, Italy, Sweden, and
Bangladesh.87 Therefore, the common notion that honor crimes occur solely
within Muslim territory is misguided and misinformed.
In fact, honor killings pre-date all written religions.88 Early justifications
for honor crimes can be found in the codes of Hammurabi in 1752 B.C. and in
the family law of the Roman Empire.89 “Ancient Roman and French law both
81 Lila Abu-Lughod, Seductions of the “Honor Crime”, 22 DIFFERENCES 17, 17–18 (2011) [hereinafter
Abu-Lughod, Seductions]; Zaunbrecher, supra note 62, at 699. Sharia “consists of sources of legislation—the
Koran and the hadiths (stories about the Prophet’s sayings and doings) and interpretations of these sources.”
Anne S. Roald, Multiculturalism and Religious Legislation in Sweden, in MUSLIM DIASPORA IN THE WEST:
NEGOTIATING GENDER, HOME AND BELONGING 55, 60 (Haideh Moghissi & Halleh Ghorashi eds., 2010).
82 See, e.g., Lisa Daftari, Muslim Backlash Against Film Will Hurt Women, Says ‘Honor Diaries’ Team,
FOX NEWS (April 2, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/04/02/muslim-backlash-against-film-will-hurtwomen-says-honor-diaries-team/.
83 See generally Celeste Montoya & Lise R. Agustín, The Othering of Domestic Violence: The EU and
Cultural Framings of Violence Against Women, 20 INT’L STUD. GENDER, STATE & SOC’Y 534 (2013)
(describing honor-related violence in the context of Islamophobia and Europe’s exclusionary approach).
84 Cohan, supra note 15, at 196.
85 Id. at 192; see WIKAN, supra note 39, at 70 (“Honor killing can be found across religions and faiths.”).
86 See Phyllis Chesler, Are Some Honor Killings More Equal Than Others?, FOX NEWS (July 12, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/07/12/phyllis-chesler-muslim-honor-killings-media/;
Ambrosia
Sabrina, Honor Killings: 10 Chilling Facts on the Hidden Epidemic, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012, 6:35
AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/honor-killings-10-chilling-facts-hidden-epidemic-402432.
87 Hillary Mayell, Thousands of Women Killed for Family “Honor”, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 12,
2002), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/02/0212_020212_honorkilling.html.
88 Ruane, supra note 48, at 1530 (citing Cinema Reel Life: Crimes of Honor (Cinemax broadcast Feb. 28,
2000)).
89 Lasson, supra note 63, at 408; see David J. Western, Islamic “Purse Strings”: The Key to the
Amelioration of Women’s Legal Rights in the Middle East, 61 A.F. L. REV. 79, 107 (2008).
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allowed a man to murder his wife or daughter for illicit sexual relationships
under certain circumstances.”90 In almost every human society, families and
communities have played an extensive role in regulating the sexual behavior of
their members, typically beginning through early socialization of children.
Furthermore, sentences for crimes committed in the “heat of passion,” which
included honor killings, were substantially mitigated under the French and
Italian Penal Codes until 1975 and 1979, respectively.91 In Brazil, honor
killings were legal until 1991.92 The origins of honor killings can thus be
traced back to ancient tribal practices that existed before—and continued
after—the invention of Islamic law, with penal codes providing leniency for
honor killers across the globe.93
Moreover, Islamic law does not promote or condone honor killings, and no
explicit approval of honor crimes exists in the Qur’an.94 Because honor killings
are acts of murder, the practice is expressly prohibited in the Qur’an: “Whoso
kills a believer intentionally, his penalty is hell, abiding therein eternally. God
shall be angry with him and curse him, and shall ready for him a grievous
torment.”95 The Qur’an places a high value on every person’s life, and honor
killings are not grounded in any religious text. Rather, Islam represents a
monotheistic religion that promotes the faith and unity of God, and upholds the
notion that men and women are equal before God (Allah).96 The Qur’an
expressly denies discrimination against women97 and does not provide a basis
for the existence of gender hierarchies within societies that perpetuate honor
killings. Consequently, Islam does not advance male superiority but instead
recognizes the equality of potential between the sexes.

90

Plant, supra note 53, at 114.
Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 10.
92 Plant, supra note 53, at 114.
93 See Matthew A. Goldstein, The Biological Roots of Heat-of-Passion Crimes and Honor Killings, 21
POL. & LIFE SCI. 28, 32 (2002) (“The Germanic tribes of Western Europe, as well as the Chinese, Japanese,
and other Asian cultures legally sanctioned the killing of unfaithful wives by their husbands to protect family
honor.”).
94 Western, supra note 89, at 107 (“Indeed, honor killings were and are forbidden under Islamic law, and
should never be practiced under any circumstances.”).
95 THE QUR’AN 4:93 (Tarif Khalidi trans., The Penguin Group 2008); see Western, supra note 89, at 104
(“According to the Quran, if either a man or women commits adultery, they should be flogged with a hundred
lashes. Nowhere does the Quran justify killing the adulterer.”).
96 See GOODWIN, supra note 36, at 30 (“Islam, in fact, may be the only religion that formally specified
women’s rights and sought ways to protect them.”).
97 Id. at 31.
91
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Furthermore, Muslims themselves, including both victims and perpetrators,
vigorously deny any connection between honor killings and Islam.98 Instead,
the justification given by those involved in the honor killing process is that
“tradition is stronger than religion.”99 Perpetrators invoke the excuse of custom
instead of religion, and argue that principles of gender relations in Sharia are
consistent with human rights law in the “West.”100 It is additionally
“paradoxical that such practices are regarded as ‘Islamic’ in the West,
considering that they have in fact come to the international agenda as a result
of successful campaigns by Muslim feminist” movements.101 Therefore, the
association between Islam and honor crimes needs to be perceived within the
current climate of Islamophobia and post-9/11 depictions of Muslims as
barbaric terrorists.102 Any inherent linkage of honor killings with Islam is
simplistic and naïve.
II. HONOR KILLINGS IN TURKEY & TURKEY’S EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION
PROSPECTS
While honor killings are not particular to Muslim societies, the crime
occurs within Turkey, a Muslim-majority country, at an alarming rate. The
number of honor killings in Turkey—and worldwide—is difficult to gauge due
to the fact that honor killings are misinterpreted, and therefore mis-reported as
suicides or accidental deaths.103 The Turkish Human Rights Directorate
estimated the number of honor killings at one per week in Istanbul alone, with
over one thousand honor killings occurring in Istanbul from 2003 to 2008.104
Other organizations, however, posit that only twenty-five to seventy-five honor
killings occur annually in Turkey.105 These organizations suggest that honor
killings in Turkey are confined to a limited region—specifically southeastern

98

Katherine P. Ewing, From German Bus Stop to Academy Award Nomination: The Honor Killing as
Simulacrum, in GENDER, VIOLENCE, AND HUMAN SECURITY: CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 163, 166
(Tripp et al. eds., 2013).
99 Stefanie E. Nanes, Fighting Honor Crimes: Evidence of Civil Society in Jordan, in DECONSTRUCTING
SEXUALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CHALLENGES AND DISCOURSES 65, 70 (Pinar Ilkkaracan ed., 2008).
100 EWING, supra note 34, at 170.
101 Pinar Ilkkaracan, Introduction to DECONSTRUCTING SEXUALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CHALLENGES
AND DISCOURSES 1, 3 (Pinar Ilkkaracan ed., 2008).
102 See Meetoo & Mirza, supra note 63, at 194.
103 POPE, supra note 57, at 29 (“For every honor murder that is reported, many more are disguised as
accidents or suicides, and for every woman who is killed, there are dozens who live in fear and face the
constant threat of violence.”).
104 Epstein, supra note 18, at 55.
105 See SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 140 (estimating Turkish honor killings between fifty and seventy-five).
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Turkey—where Kurds predominantly reside.106 Additional research by Ceren
Belge found that between 1974 and 2005, a total of 181 women had been
murdered by their families in the southeastern province of Urfa alone.107 More
recent estimates between 2009 and 2011 suggest that more than 200 honor
killings occur annually in Turkey and that this number has reached a “record
level.”108 Regardless of the actual number of honor killings reported, one fact
remains undisputed: the statistical range severely underestimates the actual and
widespread nature of the crime.
Although the precise number of honor killings in Turkey and worldwide is
unknown, these crimes have garnered increased media attention following the
EU’s acceptance of Turkey’s bid for membership. Sparking public outrage
unmatched by any other type of violence, honor killings have become a form
of sensationalized murder in which the victim is depicted as “Western” and
modernized, and the perpetrator is deemed barbaric and backward.109 This
popular discourse has developed an ethnicized and gendered tone through
mainstream media representations of the killing, and locates the victim and
assailant in separate spaces along the modernization continuum.110 Particular
forms of masculinity are thus constructed by the press as inherently threatening
and terroristic, and these portrayals are used by the state to promote political
agendas.111 In the West, these state agendas typically involve the
modernization or assimilation of Islamic groups, and result in the crime being
portrayed as a broad Muslim phenomenon.112 In Turkey, however, the prospect
of EU accession has resulted in a substantially different ethnicization of the
crime: it is purely a Kurdish problem. This section first provides a brief history
of the Kurds in Turkey, setting the stage for understanding Turkey’s
motivation for ethnicizing honor killings. Second, this section details the
ethnicization of honor killings in Turkey, and analyzes honor killing perception
within the country, particularly in the Turkish press. Finally, this section
106 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 539; Dicle Kogacioglu, The Tradition Effect: Framing Honor Crimes in
Turkey, 15 J. FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 118, 129–30 (2004).
107 Belge, supra note 65, at 55.
108 ‘Honor Killings’ Have Morphed into ‘Honor Suicides’ in Turkey, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/27/honor-killings-have-morph_n_179928.html.
109 LILA ABU-LUGHOD, DO MUSLIM WOMEN NEED SAVING? 114 (2013).
110 See Ewing, supra note 98, at 167; Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 130; Montoya & Agustín, supra note
83, at 534–40.
111 See EWING, supra note 34, at 170–71.
112 See, e.g., Bethany Corbin, A Bleeding Sin: An Examination of Honor Killings in Turkey and Germany
93–108 (May 10, 2011) (unpublished B.A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with
author).
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summarizes the EU’s response to these killings in light of Turkey’s accession
prospects and provides the background for understanding Turkey’s revised
Penal Code.
A. The Kurds
The relationship between Turkey and its Kurdish citizens is one of
complexity, brutality, and repression. Recently termed Turkey’s “Kurdish
problem,”113 the interaction between Turks and Kurds has been anything but
peaceful. Until the late 1990s, the very existence of the Kurdish people within
Turkey’s borders was considered a political crime.114 This portion of the
Article offers a brief introduction into the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, and
provides a foundation for comprehending honor killing portrayal and
perception in Turkey.
The Kurds, who live primarily in the southeastern portion of the country,
represent Turkey’s largest ethnic minority and comprise twenty percent of the
state’s population.115 Often described as “traditional” and “tribal,” the Kurds
have gained international attention for refusing to adopt the mandatory Turkish
identity.116 This unified Turkish identity developed in response to the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which was associated with failed ethnic
autonomy and diversity.117 As a reaction to this history, Mustafa Kemal
(“Kemal”) created a uniform, national Turkish identity which he forced on all
citizens living within the country’s borders.118 His goal “was to somehow
manufacture a ‘single-bodied’ Turkish nation out of many Muslim entities.”119
113 Emrullah Uslu, Turkey’s Kurdish Problem: Steps Toward a Solution, 30 STUD. CONFLICT &
TERRORISM 157, 157 (2007).
114 See id. at 158 (“Until recently, jail terms awaited Kurds who publicly asserted any form of Kurdish
identity.”).
115 MIRELA BOGDANI, TURKEY AND THE DILEMMA OF EU ACCESSION 34 (2011).
116 See HENRI J. BARKEY & GRAHAM E. FULLER, TURKEY’S KURDISH QUESTION 10–12 (1998).
117 OMAR TASPINAR, KURDISH NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY: KEMALIST IDENTITY IN
TRANSITION 38 (2005) (“Turkish nationalism, therefore, essentially emerged as a reaction to imperial
disintegration, in an environment where imperial and multi-ethnic projects failed to instigate a sense of
Ottoman patriotism.”); see Michael M. Gunter, Turkey’s Floundering EU Candidacy and Its Kurdish Problem,
14 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 117, 120 (2007) [hereinafter Gunter, Floundering EU Candidacy] (“The seemingly
obstinate refusal in the modern Republic of Turkey to admit that its citizens of Kurdish ethnic heritage
constitute a minority can be . . . further understood against the background of the gradual disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire before the onslaughts of various nationalisms during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.”).
118 See TASPINAR, supra note 117, at 77–78.
119 ALI K. OZCAN, TURKEY’S KURDS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PKK AND ABDULLAH ÖCALAN
70 (2006).
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As such, Kemal attempted to “Turkify” the ethnic minorities by demanding the
relinquishment of all native customs, languages, and rituals.120 The Kurds,
however, actively refused to adopt a purely Turkish identity and defied the
state government.121
In response to this resistance, Kemal and his successors initially denied the
very existence of the Kurds.122 The government imposed settlement and
language restrictions on the minority group and prohibited the use of the
Kurdish language until the early 1990s.123 This ban on speaking Kurdish
occurred at a time when only a small minority of Kurds (approximately four
percent) spoke any Turkish.124 Even the term “Kurd” was banned from public
use for decades.125 Human and minority rights were further withheld from the
Kurds in an attempt to force the minority group into accepting the Turkish
identity, and, “[a]s a result, the regularly repeated rhetoric of the state’s official
view ‘demonstrates’ the absence . . . of Kurdish material and spiritual
existence.”126
This denial of both linguistic and human rights to the Kurdish ethnicity
failed, however, to “Turkify” the Kurds as planned, and instead incited terrorist
activity. Kurdish terrorism, which has plagued the Turkish state for more than
twenty years, developed in direct response to the Turkish government’s
oppressive regime.127 The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (“PKK”) represents the
primary organization responsible for advocating armed conflict to achieve

120 Id. at 71; see Gunter, Floundering EU Candidacy, supra note 117, at 121 (explaining that the Turkish
Constitution permits “Turkish authorities to incriminate nonviolent expressions of ethnic identity simply on the
basis that they are contrary to the constitutional definition of ‘Turkish’ and a danger to the integrity of the
state.”); see also Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Problem in Turkey, 42 MIDDLE E. J. 389, 391 (1988)
[hereinafter Gunter, Kurdish Problem] (discussing the “Turkicization” of Kurdish villages and towns).
121 See TASPINAR, supra note 117, at 77–78. For more detailed information of the history of the Kurdish
uprising, see id. at 79–82.
122 Gunter, Kurdish Problem, supra note 120, at 398; Uslu, supra note 113, at 157.
123 See BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 34 (noting that speaking Kurdish was banned until the 1990s);
TASPINAR, supra note 117, at 82 (discussing the Settlement Law of 1934: “The purpose of the Settlement Law
was to move Kurds out of their native villages and into modernized Turkish cities in an attempt to promote
assimilation and Turkification of the minority group.”); Mesut Yegen, “Prospective-Turks” or “PseudoCitizens:” Kurds in Turkey, 63 MIDDLE E. J. 597, 600–04 (2009).
124 Gunter, Kurdish Problem, supra note 120, at 399.
125 See generally Yegen, supra note 123, at 605 (noting that the Turkish government banned all
broadcasting in Kurdish and did so without ever referencing Kurds or their language by name).
126 OZCAN, supra note 119, at 71.
127 BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 35.
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Kurdish sovereignty and independence.128 The PKK has enforced their radical
agenda through raids and ambushes, and employed over 20,000 armed
guerrillas in the southeastern provinces.129 One of the worst massacres
committed by these Kurdish insurgents occurred on June 20, 1987, when the
PKK struck the village of Pinarcik and killed over thirty people.130 Similar
deadly attacks followed on July 11, 1987 and August 18, 1987.131 These
violent uprisings forced the Turkish government to increase national security
and sparked the establishment of a village guard system in the southeast to
quell PKK resistance.132 Finally, a cease-fire was declared on August 1,
1999.133 Yet, despite this formal truce, PKK terrorist attacks continued from
2000 to 2003.134
Following the “official” end to the cease-fire in June 2004,135 violence
between the Turkish state and the PKK spiraled out of control in 2006. At least
fifteen people died during the month of March alone in clashes between the
Kurds and Turkish police.136 During this time, a second militant group, the
Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (“TAK”), implemented bombings across western
Turkey, particularly in tourist regions.137 More than a dozen people were killed
in April 2006, and at least fifteen more died in October of that same year from
PKK and TAK raids and assaults.138 This violence has escalated in recent
years, with more than 700 dead in less than fourteen months throughout 2011
and 2012.139 During one weekend alone in September 2012, “at least eight
Turkish police officers and four soldiers were killed in two separate ambushes

128 TASPINAR, supra note 117, at 94, 97–98; see BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 35 (explaining that the PKK
is a terrorist organization); Gunter, Kurdish Problem, supra note 120, at 395 (describing the PKK as
supporting armed struggle and endorsing violence).
129 Doğu Ergil, PKK: Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan, in TERROR, INSURGENCY, AND THE STATE: ENDING
PROTRACTED CONFLICTS 323, 348 (Marianee Heiberg et al. eds., 2007).
130 Gunter, Kurdish Problem, supra note 120, at 405.
131 Id.
132 See Yegen, supra note 123, at 604 (discussing increases in compulsory settlement on the grounds of
national security).
133 Uslu, supra note 113, at 159.
134 Id. Today, the Turkish military does not perceive the PKK as a legitimate organization within the state
and “therefore treats its cease-fires as meaningless.” Id. at 162.
135 Id. at 159.
136 See Turkey Timeline: A Chronology of Key Events, BBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/europe/1023189.stm.
137 Id.
138 See id.
139 Ivan Watson & Yesim Comert, Report Says Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict has Turned More Violent, CNN
(Sept. 18, 2012, 12:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/18/world/europe/turkey-war-within/.
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in southeastern Turkey,” which the PKK quickly claimed responsibility for.140
This extreme increase in violence has jeopardized any hopes of finding a quick
resolution to the Kurdish problem, and has created unease for Turks and Kurds
throughout the country.141
B. The Ethnicization of Honor Killings: A Kurdish Crime
The violent and terroristic activities of both the Turkish state and the PKK
in response to the “Kurdish problem” have created a seemingly impenetrable
divide between the Turks and their Kurdish neighbors. This conflict remains a
point of concern for Turkey’s EU accession.142 Faced with addressing both
human rights violations and Kurdish resistance in order to advance EU
accession talks, Turkey has developed a novel method of singling out the
Kurds as barbaric “others” in need of modernization and assimilation: the
linkage of honor killings with the Kurdish minority. This connection between
Kurds and honor crimes is reinforced through the media’s portrayal of the
murders and the lack of broad Turkish and Muslim identifiers.143 Instead of
perceiving the crime as a human rights violation, Turkey uses the press to
portray honor killings as a purely Kurdish phenomenon in order to justify state
intervention and modernization of the repressed ethnic minority.144 This
section briefly details the linkage of honor killings with the Kurds and explores
the rationales behind this association.
Although honor killings represent global human rights violations, the
Turkish state has worked diligently to construct the crime as belonging solely
to the Kurdish culture. Articles and reports produced by the Turkish media and
state organizations “approach the problem [of honor killings] through a
regional context and tend to correlate it to the culture of the Kurdish and
Arabic minorities for whom clan-based social formations are still
dominant.”145 The press and public associate honor killings with the eastern
and southeastern provinces of Turkey where the Kurds predominantly reside

140

Id.
See id.; see also Uslu, supra note 113, at 161 (discussing the obstacles facing resolution of the Kurdish
problem).
142 Steven Cook & John Bardemas, Report Card: Turkey and EU Membership?: The Kurds, PBS (May
14, 2008), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/turkeys-tigers/report-card-turkey-and-eu-membership/
the-kurds/838/.
143 See Corbin, supra note 112, at 60–63.
144 See id. at 63–74.
145 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 539.
141
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and where tribal social structures stand strong.146 Any honor killing
occurrences in the northern and western portions of Turkey are quickly linked
to Kurdish migration to these cities.147 In this manner, the Turkish state draws
a distinct “us versus them” boundary in which Kurds who have resided in
Turkey for generations are deemed fundamentally “other” and alien within
their own homeland.
Specifically, an examination of honor killing portrayal in the Turkish press
illuminates the linkage of honor killings with the Kurdish minority. A study on
honor killing categorization in Turkish English-language newspapers found
that honor killings were associated with Kurds and their location in
southeastern Turkey approximately seven times more than they were
associated with Muslims and Turks in general.148 Rarely was an honor killing
ascribed broadly with Muslims or the Turkish population. Instead, the reporters
who detailed these honor killings repeatedly noted the perpetrator’s Kurdish
heritage and referenced the archaic and patriarchal characteristics of both
Kurds in general and the southeastern provinces of Turkey in which they
lived.149 For example, journalist Gündüz Aktan (“Aktan”) described the
Kurdish community as having “failed to modernize” and integrate with the rest
of Turkish society.150 Reporter Göksel Bozkurt took these characterizations
further and explained that “honor killings were specific to Turkey’s eastern and
southeastern regions and that they were tied to backward standards and the
effects of poverty.”151 In 2006, Aktan even applauded “Western” media for
realizing that honor killings were related to ethnic Kurds “and that both honor
killings and the tribal system are phenomena particular to the Southeast of the
country.”152 In Aktan’s view, the words “Kurdish” and “Turkish” should not be
used interchangeably when the honor crimes occur in the southeastern region

146

Kuraner, supra note 65, at 28; Mora, supra note 15, at 506.
Ince et al., supra note 16, at 544–45.
148 Corbin, supra note 112, at 56–61.
149 Id. at 61–63; see, e.g., Kuraner, supra note 65, at 28 (“In the case of Turkey, the custom originates
from the Southeastern and Eastern Regions, where a majority of the population consists of people of Kurdish
ethnic origin.”); Mora, supra note 15, at 506 (noting that honor killings are “[o]bserved especially in the
Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey” where tribal social structure still exists).
150 Gündüz Aktan, Intellectuals and the Kurdish Identity, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Jun. 21, 2004), http://
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=intellectuals-and-the-kurdish-identity-2004-06-21.
151 Göksel Bozkurt, ‘Honor Killings’ Reflect Society as a Whole, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Nov. 20, 2005,
12:00 AM), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=honor-killings-reflect-society-asa-whole-2005-11-20.
152 Gündüz Aktan, The Tribal System, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-tribal-system-2006-11-04.
147
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of Turkey.153 These descriptions of Kurds—and the repeated references to their
socioeconomic conditions—in connection with honor killings serve to locate
honor crimes within a geographically bounded spatiality that excludes the
general Turkish population.
Scholars similarly endorse this view by imposing generalized feudal and
patriarchal characteristics on the Kurdish dominated southeast. According to
Necla Mora, honor killings are “observed especially in the Eastern and
Southeastern regions of Turkey” where “[p]reserving honor and glory comes
first in the system of values.”154 Comparably, Efsa Kuraner articulates that the
custom of honor killing “originates from the Southeastern and Eastern regions,
where a majority of the population consists of people of Kurdish ethnic
origin.”155 Kuraner proceeds to describe these regions as endorsing oppressive
patriarchal views of women’s sexuality and promoting “gender discriminatory
traditions and practices.”156 Thus, prominent scholars, including Pinar
Ilkkaracan, Hilal Ince, Efsa Kuraner, Necla Mora, Aysan Sev’er, and
Gökçeçiçek Yurdakul, all identify a connection between honor crimes and
Kurdish clans.157
By isolating honor killings in the southeastern provinces, Turkish reporters
and state organizations have ethnicized the crime and attributed it primarily to
a disadvantaged minority group.158 The depiction of Kurds as conservative,
ignorant, homogenous, and tribal suggests that this ethnicity has failed to
modernize and that its ideals and customs are incompatible with a modern,
“westernized” country.159 Mesut Yegen even suggests that “[t]he status of
153

See id.
See Mora, supra note 15, at 506–07.
155 Kuraner, supra note 65, at 28.
156 Id.
157 See Pinar Ilkkaracan, How Adultery Almost Derailed Turkey’s Aspirations to Join the European
Union, in SEX POLITICS: REPORTS FROM THE FRONTLINES 247, 261–62 (Parker E., Petchesky R. & Sembler R.
eds., 2007) (“[T]he term ‘custom killings’ is associated primarily with a practice more prevalent in eastern and
southeastern Turkey, in the context of a semi-feudal traditional agricultural economy and among a
predominantly Kurdish population.”); Ince et al., supra note 16, at 544 (“In Turkey, customary killings
commonly occur in villages or large enclaves where Arabian or Kurdish clans exist.”); see Kuraner, supra note
65, at 28 (“[The] custom originates from the Southeastern and Eastern Regions, where a majority of the
population consists of people of Kurdish ethnic origin.”); see generally Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at
970 (noting that “[r]ural populations [in Turkey], especially in eastern regions, often occupy the lowest rungs
on the socioeconomic ladder, are most likely to be undereducated or illiterate, and are most vulnerable to
religious and cultural misconceptions or even extremism,” which causes unforgiving patriarchal expectations
of gender relations).
158 Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 130.
159 See Corbin, supra note 112, at 74.
154
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Kurds vis a vis Turkishness is now much closer to that of non-Muslims” than
to Muslims and Turks.160 This discursive isolation of honor killings enables the
Turkish state not only to disassociate itself from the murders, but also to target
Kurds for forced assimilation and integration programs. Given the active and
violent resistance of Kurds to adopting a uniform Turkish identity,
governmental efforts to assimilate the Kurds remain a high priority.161
Particularly, the Turkish government’s strategy of “otherization” has
helped to diminish national support for the Kurds and has increased their
alienation within society.162 By constructing the Kurds as social outcasts,
Turkey sets the stage for upcoming modernization and assimilation projects
that target the Kurds. Describing the southeastern territory as undeveloped,
feudal, and tribal enables Turkey to link the Kurds to these characteristics
simply through their place of residence. In doing so, Turkey portrays the Kurds
as fundamentally different from the rest of society and in need of both
modernized values and infrastructure. This depiction of Kurds combined with
international pressure for Turkey to address its Kurdish problem has provided
another opportunity for “Turkification.”
Finally, the perception of honor killings as a purely Kurdish phenomenon
in Turkey is no doubt partly triggered by Turkey’s repeated attempts to gain
membership into the European Union. Turkey’s inability to deny the existence
of these heinous crimes has inflamed the “Western” consciousness and caused
the EU to recognize these killings as an impediment to integration.163
According to journalist Fulya Özerkan, “The practice of honor killings has
long marred Turkey’s drive to improve women’s rights, a key demand of the
European Union.”164 By stigmatizing the Kurdish ethnicity as backward,
barbaric, inhuman, and essentially non-Muslim, Turkey constructs an “usversus-them” divide in which it removes itself from the crime altogether. This
perceived spatial distance absolves the state of any responsibility for the
murders and places Turkey in line with the EU in attempting to eradicate the
crime.

160

Yegen, supra note 123, at 610.
See BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 34–35.
162 See Corbin, supra note 112, at 50.
163 Id. at 11.
164 Fulya Özerkan, UN Urges Probe on Suicide Cases Among Women, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (June 4,
2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=un-urges-probe-on-suicide-cases-amongwomen-2006-06-04.
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C. European Union Pressure to Eliminate Honor Killings in Turkey
The Turkish state’s separation from honor killings, regardless of motive,
has become crucial in the battle for EU accession. Despite the existence of
honor killings in Turkey for decades, the crime only recently garnered
international attention and interest due to Turkey’s EU membership
prospects.165 These sensationalized stories of honor killings help distinguish
the crime from ordinary domestic violence, and arouse anger among the
citizens of “Western” nations.166 Frequently cited as an excuse to delay
accession negotiations, Turkey’s flawed human rights record, which includes
honor crimes, has become a recurring impediment to EU membership.167 In an
attempt to remedy its human rights deficit, the Turkish state has initiated
radical legal reforms in response to EU demand.168 This section provides a
succinct introduction to Turkey’s history with the EU, and illustrates how EU
pressure stimulated the revisions in Turkey’s Penal Code, which is discussed in
Section III.
Long perceived as an “awkward candidate” for EU membership, Turkey’s
trajectory for accession has been arduous and strained. Currently, Turkey
remains the only candidate country that has not received a timetable for
accession.169 Although Turkey’s candidacy for membership was officially
recognized in December 1999 at the Helsinki Council, this recognition
followed decades of negotiation talks and agreements between Turkey and the
EU:
Turkey applied for associate membership in the EU—then the EEC—
as early as 1959. The application resulted in an Association
Agreement in 1963, whereby Turkey and the EU would conditionally
and gradually create a customs union by 1995 at the latest. The
customs union was seen as a step towards full membership at an
unspecified future date. The EU unilaterally granted Turkey
preferential tariffs and financial assistance, but the process of staged,
mutual reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers was delayed in the
1970s because of economic and political conditions in Turkey.
165

See Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 134 .
See ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 109, at 7–8.
167 See Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, at 42, COM
(2013) 700 final (Oct. 16, 2013).
168 See generally MINISTRY FOR EU AFF., REPUBLIC OF TURK., THE TURKISH NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR
THE ADOPTION OF THE ACQUIS (2007–2013) [hereinafter TURKISH NATIONAL PROGAMME FOR THE ADOPTION
OF THE ACQUIS], available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=6&l=2.
169 Sübidey Togan, Turkey: Toward EU Accession, 27 THE WORLD ECON. 1013, 1013 (2004).
166
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Turkey [then] applied for full membership in 1987. The response in
1990 was that accession negotiations could not be undertaken at the
time, since the EU was engaged in major internal changes as well as
in the transition of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. . . . A
breakthrough came at the Helsinki meeting of the European Council
in 1999, when Turkey attained status as a candidate for
membership.170

Notwithstanding this official recognition, the first Accession Partnership
Agreement for Turkey did not materialize until March 2001, and was later
revised in 2003 and 2006.171 During these interim periods, Turkey was advised
to prepare a national program for the adoption of all EU standards, including a
realistic timetable for achieving all Accession Partnership requirements.172
This included altering Turkey’s existing legislation in order to adopt the acquis
communautaire, which is the legal framework of the EU.173 Turkey responded
on March 19, 2001, by presenting its National Program, which included a fivehundred page document outlining Turkey’s intended reforms to harmonize its
economic, social, and political policies with those of the EU.174 To date,
however, Turkey has opened only thirteen of the thirty-five chapters in its
negotiations, and has closed only one of those chapters.175 Eight chapters were
frozen in 2006 due to Turkey’s “non-implementation of the Additional
Protocol to its customs union agreement, which concerned the opening of
Turkish ports and airports to Cypriot-flagged vessels and flights.”176 This
persistent refusal to enforce the Additional Protocol further resulted in the EU
vetoing another five chapters.177 In addition to these economic and political
setbacks, the European Commission has expressed continued concern with
Turkey’s human rights framework, causing further delay in Turkey’s EU
accession talks.

170

Id.
Rebecca Boon, They Killed Her for Going Out with Boys: Honor Killings in Turkey in Light of
Turkey’s Accession to the European Union and Lessons for Iraq, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 815, 824 (2006); see
generally Council Decision 2006/35/EC, On the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the
Accession Partnership with Turkey, 2006 O.J. (L22) [hereinafter Accession Partnership].
172 See generally Accession Partnership, supra note 171.
173 Togan, supra note 169, at 1013.
174 See generally TURKISH NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE ACQUIS, supra note 168.
175 Nathalie Tocci, Unblocking Turkey’s EU Accession, 12 INSIGHT TURKEY 27, 27–28 (2010).
176 Id. at 28.
177 Id.
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Among the economic, political, and democratic standards required for
Turkey to adopt is the Copenhagen Criteria.178 The Copenhagen Criteria exists
as a document that must be ratified by all EU candidate members and ensures
guarantees of democracy and human rights.179 As part of this criteria, a
member state must satisfy three prongs: (1) the creation of a functioning
market economy; (2) adherence to the EU’s political, economic, and monetary
union; and (3) the promotion of stable institutions that guarantee democracy
and human rights.180 This third requirement, also termed the political prong,
encompasses human, minority, and women’s rights.181 While Turkey’s efforts
to fulfill these provisions were initially widely praised by both the EU and the
United States in 2003,182 the EU nonetheless expressed repeated dissatisfaction
regarding Turkey’s treatment of women and minorities in subsequent years.
Specifically, the EU’s 2005 Progress Report noted an extreme lack of
advancement by Turkish officials with regards to improving women’s rights.
Evidence of Turkey’s failure to reform women’s rights was found specifically
in the area of honor killings, which remained “a matter of serious concern.”183
Both the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions expressed
apprehension over Turkey’s misrepresentation and underreporting of honor
crimes.184 In the first eight months of 2006 alone, the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECHR”) issued 198 judgments stating that Turkey was in
violation of at least one ECHR article.185 Additionally, EU officials raised
legitimate criticism that the Turkish Penal Code provided lenient sentences to
perpetrators of honor crimes, and that the Turkish state had essentially become

178 See Diane Hickey, The As Yet Unfulfilled Promise and Potential of European Union Human Rights
Law, WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 647, 667–68 (2009).
179 Boon, supra note 171, at 824.
180 Elif Üçer, Turkey’s Accession to the European Union, 38 FUTURES 197, 200 (2006).
181 Id.
182 See Hickey, supra note 178, at 668.
183 Turkey: 2005 Progress Report, at 32, COM (2005) 561 final (Nov. 9, 2005).
184 See Yakin Ertürk, Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of
15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council” Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, its Causes and Consequences, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/34/Add.2 (Jan. 5, 2007); see also Christof
Heyns, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47/Add.2 (Mar. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur on
Executions Report].
185 William Chislett, The EU’s Progress Report on Turkey’s Accession: Derailment or Shunted into a
Siding?, REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO, at 4 (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/
rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI%20114-2006.
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complicit in such killings.186 These concerns were echoed in the 2007 Progress
Report for Turkey, which noted continued inadequacies in Turkey’s protection
and enforcement of human rights.187
Turkey’s difficulty in improving human rights has become a repeated
criticism of the EU today and remains a “major stumbling block in
negotiations.”188 The most recent 2013 Progress Report complained that
“[d]omestic violence, occasional honour killings and the issue of early and
forced marriages remain a serious concern” in Turkey’s accession talks.189
Many EU member states continue to perceive Turkey as a highly patriarchal
society with oppressive gender stereotypes ingrained in its social fabric.190
These shortcomings must be addressed in order to bring Turkey in line with
European standards.
The negative publicity associated with Turkey’s treatment of minorities and
women has served not only to stall negotiation talks, but has also caused EU
member states to actively resist Turkey’s bid for membership. The linkage of
honor killings with Turkey—and, by association, Muslims in general—led
critics to argue that Muslim immigrants from Turkey would be unable to
“integrate because Islam is inassimilable and therefore a threat to a ‘European
identity.’”191 These stereotypes were further fueled by the tragedy of 9/11,
which categorized all Muslim men as terrorists and all Muslim women as
victims of male domination and oppression.192 This heightened the perceived
incompatibility of Islam and Christianity, drawing further attention to the
cultural uniqueness of honor killings during Turkey’s attempted accession.193
Thus, the EU began to place increased pressure on Turkey to strengthen its
human rights law, and mandated certain reforms to the Turkish Penal Code as
a key element of future accession negotiations.194
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See Special Rapporteur on Executions Report, supra note 184, ¶ 46.
Hickey, supra note 178, at 668.
188 BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 27.
189 Turkey 2013 Progress Report, at 2, SWD (2013) 417 final (Oct. 10, 2013).
190 See BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 30, 47.
191 Ahmet Yükleyen, Compatibility of “Islam” and “Europe”: Turkey’s EU Accession, 11 INSIGHT
TURKEY 115, 116 (2009).
192 See BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 127.
193 See id. at 128.
194 Hickey, supra note 178, at 669.
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III. HONOR KILLINGS UNDER THE TURKISH PENAL CODE
In direct response to EU criticism, Turkey implemented legislative reforms
in September 2004.195 These modifications sparked initial optimism within the
EU, and represented an attempt to harmonize Turkey’s legal framework with
existing EU laws.196 As part of these revisions, Turkey adopted extensive
human rights legislation designed to “crack down” on honor killings.197 By
implementing these reforms and simultaneously portraying honor killings as a
purely Kurdish phenomenon, Turkey successfully distanced itself from these
heinous human rights violations. However, an unanticipated consequence of
this top-down transformation was the accusation by scholars and reporters that
honor killings had merely transformed into honor suicides. This section
analyzes the revisions of the Turkish Penal Code with respect to honor killings,
and highlights the important changes in criminal sentencing that caused
scholars to link this metamorphosis with the revised Penal Code.
A. The Former Turkish Penal Code and Legal Pluralism
In 1926, Turkey adopted its first modern Penal Code, which was modeled
substantially after the Italian Criminal Code of 1889.198 Referred to now as the
“former” or “old” Penal Code, this set of laws existed until Turkey’s adoption
of the new criminal code in late 2004. Under this former code, honor killings
became a type of state-sanctioned femicide in which the Turkish government
offered complicity in the murders.199 Such complicity was evidenced by
Turkish penal provisions “that explicitly offer[ed] perpetrators of crimes of
honour exoneration from their actions, with the honour motif as mitigation.”200
Turkish judicial decisions under this code thus recognized and provided
mitigation for criminal sentences based on honor or “custom” murders,
implicitly legitimizing the killings. These lenient provisions remained in effect
until EU officials threatened to halt accession talks unless perpetrators faced
harsher sanctions.
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Ertürk, supra note 184, at para. 55.
E.g., Hickey, supra note 178, at 668.
197 Id. at 669.
198 Adnan Güriz, Sources of Turkish Law, in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 1, 9 (Tuğrul Ansay & Don
Wallace eds., 2011).
199 Arin, supra note 50, at 823; see Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 987.
200 Sen, supra note 37, at 49.
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Under the former Penal Code, the punishment for intentional murder was a
minimum sentence of twenty-four years imprisonment.201 When the intentional
murder was committed against family members, parents, or children, or was
premeditated, the perpetrator received capital punishment under Articles 449
and 450.202 Provided that honor killings are premeditated intentional murders
against family members, the minimum allowable punishment under the former
Penal Code should have been life imprisonment without the possibility for
parole in cases brought after 2004 and capital punishment for cases brought
prior to 2004.203
Despite the clarity of these textbook sentences, most honor killing
perpetrators rarely spent more than twenty years in prison under the former
code, and acquittals were surprisingly common. In Siverek, for example,
“nearly half of all honor killing cases tried in courts between 1996 and 2004
(44.4 percent) resulted in acquittal and the average sentence length for every
woman murdered was 10.2 years.”204 Similar data was obtained in Urfa
between 1974 and 2005, where the average sentence for an honor killing was
18.2 years in prison; however, the actual time served by most perpetrators was
less than thirteen years, with a steady acquittal rate of twenty percent.205 Only
seven percent of perpetrators in Urfa received life sentences or capital
punishment.206 In Turkey overall, sentences were lowest from 1974 to 1989,
with the average perpetrator spending less than 11.1 years in prison, and
increased gradually from 1996 to 2005, where the average sentence became
15.7 years in prison.207 While the acquittal rate decreased overall from twentyfour percent in 1990 to eighteen percent in 2005, the acquittal rate for underaged perpetrators remained constant.208
The high acquittal rates and low sentences for honor killing perpetrators
were the direct result of Articles 462, 51, 29, and 59 of the former Penal Code.
These articles worked in conjunction to afford perpetrators substantial penalty

201 WIKAN, supra note 39, at 82 (describing the typical punishment for murder as either life imprisonment
or execution); see Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 123.
202 Belge, supra note 65, at 50.
203 Turkey provisionally abolished the death penalty in 2002 and abolished it completely in 2004. Daren
Butler, Erdogan Moots Restoring Death Penalty in Turkey, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2012, 8:26 AM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/11/12/us-turkey-erdogan-deathpenalty-idUSBRE8AB0K620121112.
204 Belge, supra note 65, at 93.
205 See generally id. at 55–73.
206 Id.
207 See id. at 73.
208 Id.
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reductions in the event of prosecution. Articles 462 and 29 of the former Penal
Code defined usage of the provocation defense and offered sentence reductions
of up to seven-eighths in cases of provoked homicide.209 Specifically, Article
462 covered instances of special aggravating provocation and applied primarily
to situations where the perpetrator discovered that a first-degree relative was
involved in an illicit or pre-marital relationship.210 Honor crimes were thus
typically presented as homicides committed in the heat of passion, and were
treated under Articles 462 and 29 as cases of unjust provocation. Article 462
even explicitly reduced a perpetrator’s punishment to one-eighth of the original
sentence.211 The combination of Articles 462 and 29 typically resulted in the
acquittal of murderous perpetrators despite the lapse in time between the affair
and the killing. In fact, these provocation defenses were granted in
approximately sixty-three percent of cases in which they were applicable.212
Furthermore, Article 462 was often used in combination with Article 51,
which served as a general mitigation clause.213 Article 51 reduced a
perpetrator’s sentence by up to two-thirds if the individual committed
homicide as a result of uncontrollable grief or provocation.214 When upheld,
this defense offered an additional two-thirds penalty reduction in conjunction
with the seven-eighths reduction afforded by Article 462.215 Similarly, Article
59 permitted a judge, in his or her sole discretion, to further reduce a
perpetrator’s sentence by one-sixth.216 These sentence reductions, combined
with the minimum age for prosecution, made it extremely difficult for the
Turkish judicial system to effectively prosecute honor killing perpetrators
under the age of eighteen.217 Thus, the Turkish state was deemed complicit in
crimes of honor for its failure to harshly and effectively prosecute the
perpetrators and eradicate the offense under the former Penal Code.
These mitigating provisions cannot, however, be analyzed in a vacuum, and
the key to understanding these sentence reductions lies in the existence of legal
209

Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 971.
Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 122–23; Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 23.
211 Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 123.
212 Belge, supra note 65, at 73.
213 Canan Arin, Legal Mechanisms Regarding Violence Against Women, SOUTH EASTERN EUROPEAN
WOMEN’S LEGAL INITIATIVE (Aug. 22, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20051116232344/http://www.
seeline-project.net/CCR/TurkeyCCR.htm.
214 Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 123.
215 Id.; Rushmi Ramakrishna, Universal Rights, Non-Universal Process: Confronting Culturally
Grounded Human Rights Abuses, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1383, 1403 (2009).
216 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 182.
217 WIKAN, supra note 39, at 82.
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pluralism within Turkish society. Defined at its basic core as the existence of
multiple legal systems in one geographic area, legal pluralism challenges the
traditional notion of “law” as a solitary system.218 “To put it simply, legal
pluralism recognizes multiple forms of ordering and bodies of rules which may
be central to the lives of individuals but which are not dependent upon the state
or state law for recognition or legitimacy.”219 Legal pluralism thus creates a
space in which law and culture blend to erode the ideal of a single, textually
explicit source of law.
In Turkey, legal pluralism was acknowledged and endorsed by judges from
all legal circuits, and blurred the boundary between state law and familial
rights.220 Although the Turkish state espoused a solidified and unitary legal
system, the unspoken reality was that the state was not the sole source of law
and authority in Turkish society. Rather, Turkish courts recognized a family’s
de facto right to control and punish its own members, and shared legal power
with the family unit.221 This sharing of authority facilitated the judicial
perception of honor killings as regional and familial customs that should be
subjected to lenient criminal sanctions.222 Specifically, “[t]he framing of honor
killings as ‘regional custom’ opened the way for both pluralist arguments for
mitigating sentences based on the cultural background of the accused, and for
legal centralist arguments on the supremacy of state law over custom.”223 This
legal discourse defined a broader pattern of the state’s relationship with clan
families, and led to the relinquishment of substantial judicial control over the
family unit as a whole.
This bifurcated legal system arose partly from Turkey’s rotating officer
system and the state officials’ unfamiliarity with Kurdish language and
politics. In an effort to promote employee loyalty towards the state, the Turkish
elites limited the term for a judicial officer in Eastern or Southeastern Turkey
to less than three years.224 This rotating placement kept judicial and law
enforcement officials purposefully ignorant of the communities in which they
served. As a result, state officials came to view the Kurdish communities as

218 SAMIA BANO, MUSLIM WOMEN AND SHARI’AH COUNCILS: TRANSCENDING
COMMUNITY AND LAW 73–74 (2012).
219 Id. at 74.
220 Corbin, supra note 112, at 125.
221 Id.
222 See Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 987.
223 Belge, supra note 65, at 66.
224 See generally id. at 88–100.
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dangerous and separate from the mainstream Turkish population.225 Poised to
consider the Kurdish ethnicity as inherently alien, officials readily accepted
arguments that women in these regions were bound by familial customs that
should be handled within the family.226 Laws implemented in Eastern Turkey
emphasized that conduct should be viewed in light of regional practices and
family expectations.227 Thus, the centrality and uniformity of the legal system
began to break down and ushered in a defining era of legal pluralism.
B. The Revised Turkish Penal Code—A Step in the Right Direction
The reign of legal pluralism began its slow demise in the late 1990s and
early 2000s as judicial officers noted incompatibilities between family customs
and state law.228 This shift unsurprisingly coincided with the politicization of
the Kurdish-Turkish boundary.229 Faced with the Kurdish uprising and demand
for autonomy, the Turkish government imposed stringent laws aimed at
repressing the Kurdish minority.230 However, as Turkey’s EU accession
negotiations gained momentum, the state was forced to recognize the Kurdish
ethnicity and improve both minority and human rights.
In direct response to EU pressure and growing outrage over Turkey’s
lenient honor provisions, the Turkish government expedited legislative change
in 2004 by revising the Turkish Penal Code.231 Modified in accordance with
the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey’s new Penal Code “resulted in a sudden shift
from laws that arguably protect honor killing and are strongly genderdiscriminatory to a new penal code and constitutional amendments, which . . .
reject honorable motives as justification for murder.”232 Thus, the new Penal
Code envisioned heavy prison terms—even life sentences—for homicide
motivated by custom and honor.

225

Abu-Lughod, Seductions, supra note 81, at 46.
For example, Turkish judges invoked “regional traditions” and “customs” as explanations for their
sentence reductions. See Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 124 (noting that judges view honor crimes as “the
result of ‘an unlucky turn of tradition,’ a case of ‘traditions getting out of hand.’” These judges “saw their
colleagues as ‘appropriately’ taking social norms into consideration when judging.”).
227 Id. at 124.
228 See Belge, supra note 65, at 55–57.
229 See id.
230 See id.
231 The Turkish Penal Code was officially promulgated on September 26, 2004. See generally TÜRK CEZA
KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004, Kanun 5237, (Turk.).
232 Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 23.
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In particular, Article 462 of the unrevised Penal Code, which provided a
mitigating defense for homicide in conjunction with Article 51, was
revoked.233 Comparably, Article 29 of the unrevised code, which reduced
penalties in the event of “unjust provocation,” was substantially amended to
clarify its inapplicability to honor killings.234 According to revised Article 29,
“family members and relatives who commit honor killings . . . cannot benefit
from a reduction [of penalty.]”235 Additionally, Article 82, which discusses
aggravating circumstances for homicide, was revised to include “custom”
killings,236 and Article 453 was amended to impose heavier sanctions for honor
killings of children.237 Under revised Article 453, the imprisonment term
increased from a maximum of eight years to a maximum of twelve years.238
Similarly, Article 457 increased the penalty by an additional one-third to onehalf of the original sentence if the violence was committed against a family
member.239 Where the perpetrator stands in a guardian relationship with the
victim (i.e. parent), Articles 414 through 416 mandate that the proscribed
punishment be doubled.240
The most important revision to the Penal Code, however, came in the form
of Article 38. Article 38 provides that the perpetrator of an honor killing—
typically the youngest brother—and the family council responsible for the
decision to commit the crime are to be punished equally.241 The effect of this
article is to eliminate the immunity that family councils and young perpetrators
once enjoyed. Members of a dishonored family can no longer select the
youngest male to commit the murder and escape from punishment. Rather, the

233 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 182. Article 51, however, remains in effect “and again has been used to
reduce the punishment for [honor killings] by as much as a third.” Id.
234 Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 23; see TÜRK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004,
Kanun 5237, art. 29 (Turk.).
235 Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 23; see TÜRK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004, art.
29 (Turk.).
236 ELA ANIL ET AL., TURKISH CIVIL AND PENAL CODE REFORMS FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE : THE
SUCCESS OF TWO NATIONWIDE CAMPAIGNS 63 (1st ed. 2005). See generally WIKAN, supra note 39, at 82
(stating that honor killings “are seen as an aggravated circumstance for murder crimes”); e.g., TÜRK CEZA
KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004, Kanun 5237, art. 82 (Turk.).
237 Boon, supra note 171, at 836.
238 Id. at 836.
239 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 176.
240 Id. at 178.
241 ANIL ET AL., supra note 236, at 63; see TÜRK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004,
Kanun 5237, art. 38 (Turk.).
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entire family is tried and sentenced without the leniency of the unrevised Penal
Code.242
Although Turkey has taken commendable legislative and judicial action on
paper to eradicate honor killings, sentencing still remains largely within the
discretion of the judge.243 Textual changes to the law cannot simply eliminate
the patriarchal and cultural biases that may influence a judge’s decisionmaking process.244 “Even when an institution operates legally or efficiently,
the undermining of women’s rights may be an integral part of its daily modus
operandi or its ideological structure.”245 Most judges in Turkey remain social
conservatives who interpret the law as offering light punishments to honor
killers despite these amendments.246 Such an understanding of the law is
legitimized on the ground that the term “honor killing” never once appears in
the Turkish Penal Code.247 Rather, the Penal Code references “custom killing,”
which judges may differentiate on a purely technical basis from honor killing.
According to KA-MER, one of the largest women’s groups in Turkey focused
on combatting honor killings, “[t]he law has changed, but you don’t see it yet
in the courts when verdicts are handed out. Judges don’t always follow the new
laws, they follow their own feelings too.”248 Therefore, while Turkey has
achieved substantial progress in terms of legal reformation, the practical effect
on daily activities is uncertain.

242 See Hickey, supra note 178, at 669; see also TÜRK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26,
2004, Kanun 5237, art. 38 (Turk.).
243 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 181.
244 See Gareth Jones, Turkey Faces Battle to Stamp Out ‘Honor Killings’, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY
(Apr. 7, 2006), http://www.aina.org/news/20060407001803.htm (highlighting that “[a]lthough welcome,
tougher laws barely begin to tackle the deep social and cultural roots of honor killings.”); see also Leyla
Pervizat, In the Name of Honor, CARNEGIE COUNCIL FOR ETHICS IN INT’L AFFAIRS, http://www.
carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_10/articles/1058.html/:pf_printable (last accessed Mar. 9,
2014) [hereinafter Pervizat, In the Name of Honor] (“Violence against women is legitimized by the attitudes of
state actors, many mainstream human rights activists, and Turkish society at large because ultimately gender
imbalances are the status quo.”).
245 Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 121.
246 Europe: An UnEuropean Habit: Honour Killings in Turkey, THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 53
[hereinafter An UnEuropean Habit].
247 Leyla Pervizat, Lack of Due Diligence: Judgments of Crimes of Honour in Turkey, in HONOUR,
VIOLENCE, WOMEN AND ISLAM 142, 151 (Mohammad M. Idriss & Tahir Abbas eds., 2011); Derya Tekin,
Victims of Law: The Efficiency of Turkish Penal System on Honour Killings, STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 12–13
(Nov. 2012), http://www.strategicoutlook.org/publications/victims_of_law_the_efficiency_of_turkish_penal_
system_on_honour_killings.pdf.
248 Jones, supra note 244 (quoting a representative from KA-MER) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF HONOR KILLINGS INTO HONOR SUICIDES—IS
THE REVISED TURKISH PENAL CODE TO BLAME?
While the workable reality of Turkey’s new Penal Code remains unsettled,
it is undeniable that these laudable changes have failed to reduce honor killings
in any appreciable manner. Though honor killing perpetrators face harsh
prosecution under the revised Penal Code for committing an honor crime, the
prospect of imprisonment has allegedly only altered the form of honor killings
instead of eradicating them. According to scholars, the phenomenon of “honor
suicide” emerged simultaneously with the adoption of the new Penal Code as a
method for cleansing family honor without risking criminal punishment.249
Rather than electing the youngest male to perform the murder, Turkish families
have now begun to urge the tainted females to take their own lives and spare
their families the loss of two members—one in death and one in prison.250
When viewed in conjunction with worldwide trends in suicide, scholars argue
that the causal connection between the Penal Code revisions and the
transformation of honor killings into honor suicides is undeniable.251 The
problem with this bold assertion, however, is that scholars have failed to take
into account honor suicides that occurred under the former Penal Code, and
have not provided statistical data to demonstrate a marked increase in female
suicides after the revised code’s adoption. This section traces the
metamorphosis of honor killings into honor suicides and challenges the widely
held belief that Turkey’s legal revisions caused this transformation.
A. In Support of Causation: The Link Between the Revised Penal Code and
Honor Suicides
Prior to the Penal Code revisions in 2004, honor suicides were rarely
mentioned in Turkish and international news. The depth of coverage for honor
suicides extended only to the mere mention of honor killings occasionally
being disguised as suicides.252 Statistics and detailed information regarding
these suicides were unavailable, and the act garnered little media attention. The
term “honor suicide” remained a relatively undefined phrase in literature and
scholarship. Following the adoption of the new Penal Code in late 2004,
249

See, e.g., Cohan, supra note 15, at 193; Kuraner, supra note 65, at 28–29; see also Daniel Howden,
UN Investigates ‘Forced Suicides’ in Turkey, THE INDEPENDENT (May 25, 2006), http://www.independent.co.
uk/news/world/europe/un-investigates-forced-suicides-in-turkey-479641.html.
250 Cohan, supra note 15, at 193.
251 See Bilefsky, supra note 2.
252 See WIKAN, supra note 39, at 77 (stating that “[h]onor killings may also be camouflaged as suicides”).
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however, news agencies and the United Nations noted a drastic spike in
Turkish female suicides.253 The coincidental timing between the appearance of
suicides and the implementation of harsh punishments for perpetrators of
honor killings led scholars to establish a causal link between the two
variables.254 When viewed in conjunction with worldwide trends in suicide, the
connection between the Penal Code revisions and this metamorphosis appears
misleadingly strong.
Across the globe—and particularly in Western countries—men are three to
four times more likely than women to commit suicide.255 Those women in the
West who do commit suicide are typically over the age of forty-five.256 In
Turkey, however, the highest proportion of suicides is committed by young
females under the age of twenty-four.257 Females under twenty-four years old
account for fifty percent of all Turkish suicide victims, and that percentage is
expected to increase in the upcoming years.258 There is no other place in the
world with the exception of China that reports higher suicide rates for women
than men.259
While these “mysterious suicides” have typically been treated with
suspicion in Turkey, an allegedly dramatic increase in the suicide rate for 2006
sparked a UN investigation.260 As of May 2006, over thirty-six women had
attempted suicide in Turkey, which surpassed the rate for the entire 2005
year.261 In the province of Van alone, there were twenty suicides up through
May 2006, compared with a total of eighty to ninety between the years 2000
and 2003.262 By June 2007, more than nineteen young women had attempted
suicide in Batman, and most were successful.263 According to scholars, these

253

See Howden, supra note 249.
Ramakrishna, supra note 215, at 1404.
255 Suna Erdem, Honour Suicides: Death by a Bullet in the Back, THE TIMES, May 25, 2006, at 45; see
Murat Coskun et al., Suicide Rates among Turkish and American Youth: A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 16
ARCHIVES SUICIDE RESEARCH 59, 63–64 (2012).
256 Boris Kálnoky, Rätselhafte Selbstmord-Serie erschüttert die Türkei, DIE WELT (Aug. 28, 2011), http://
www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article13561160/Raetselhafte-Selbstmord-Serie-erschuettert-die-Tuerkei.html.
257 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 170.
258 Coskun et al., supra note 255, at 63–64.
259 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 170.
260 Erdem, supra note 255; see Bilefsky, supra note 2.
261 Howden, supra note 249.
262 Erdem, supra note 255.
263 Smith, supra note 21.
254
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“[u]nusually high rates of suicide among young people are a rather recent
phenomenon.”264
In light of the high suicide rate, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women visited the southeastern provinces of Turkey in 2006 to
determine whether the suicides were disguised honor killings. The Rapporteur
cited cases in which police suspected hidden murders, and acknowledged that
some of the suicides were likely cloaked honor killings.265 Although the
Rapporteur could not conclude that all of the suicides were disguised murders,
she did express horror at the number of reported female deaths in Turkey.266
Despite this unsatisfying conclusion, KA-MER conducted face-to-face
interviews with over 1,800 women and determined that a large proportion of
these suicides were forced or cajoled.267
Moreover, when compared with suicides internationally, approximately
seventy-seven percent “of the Batman women who took their own lives used
extremely ‘violent’ and ‘irreversible’ ways to do so (hung, shot or burned
themselves to death).”268 This is in stark contrast to international literature on
suicides, which states that women generally use less effective and less violent
means of killing themselves (for example, ingesting sleeping pills).269 Thus,
the violent methods used are consistent with the theory of forced suicide, and
suggest that these suicides are a transformed version of honor killings. Given
the alleged recentness of the metamorphosis combined with the convenient
timing of the revised Penal Code’s implementation, a causal connection
between the two events appears plausible.
B. The Devil’s Advocate: Why The Causation Theory is Flawed
Although scholars intuitively posit that harsher punishments under the
revised Penal Code increase the suicide risk for honor killing victims, the
researchers fail to prove that honor suicides developed or increased after the
revised Penal Code took effect. While the publicity of honor suicides
skyrocketed after 2004, the news articles and statistics repeatedly reference
264

Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 129.
United Nations Expert on Violence Against Women Concludes Mission in Turkey, U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS (May 31, 2006), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=7658&
LangID=E; see Bilefsky, supra note 2.
266 Howden, supra note 249.
267 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 161.
268 Id. at 171.
269 Id.
265
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honor suicides that occurred during the late 1990s and early 2000s, before the
adoption of the revised Penal Code.270 There are few facts to suggest the
phenomenon of honor suicides arose in direct response to the threat of
imprisonment for perpetrators. The inability of scholars to explain the
existence of honor suicides before the adoption of the revised Penal Code casts
doubt on their conclusions.
First, the existence of a high female suicide rate in Turkey—and
particularly southeastern Turkey—simply supports the proposition that honor
suicides occur within the Turkish state, not that they arose primarily after
2004. According to an article published by Christine Toomey in 2006, 281
females attempted suicide in Batman between 2001 and 2005, which was three
times the number of attempts by men.271 This statistic, while shocking on its
face, includes both pre- and post-revision suicides combined. There is no effort
by the author to separate out the rate of suicide before and after the
implementation of the revised Penal Code. Instead, the author simply makes
the sweeping conclusion that the revisions in the Turkish Penal Code,
combined with EU demands for Turkey to improve human rights, have caused
this tragic development.272 However, without a detailed list of year-by-year
suicide rates, it is impossible to substantiate this claim.
Scholar Jan Goodwin similarly offers a link between the revised Turkish
Penal Code and honor suicides, directly stating that “Turkish authorities now
suspect that ‘honor suicides’ are replacing traditional honor killings.”273 In
support of this assertion, Goodwin reports that between 2001 and 2006 there
were 1806 honor killings in Turkey and 5375 female suicides.274 Goodwin
suggests that these numbers support the conclusion that honor killings are
decreasing across Turkey while honor suicides are on the rise.275
Unfortunately, Goodwin commits the same error as Toomey, in that she
combines both pre- and post-revision incidents to inflate the statistics.
Goodwin never contrasts the number of pre- and post-revision honor killings
and suicides. Rather, Goodwin uses a five-year time period that offers no
meaningful comparison of data.276 This is true even if Goodwin’s thesis centers

270
271
272
273
274
275
276

See Christine Toomey, Where Beast Meets West, SUNDAY TIMES, May 14, 2006, at 45–46.
Id. at 45.
See id. at 44.
Goodwin, supra note 2.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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solely on EU pressure and not the Penal Code itself causing the transformation
of honor killings into honor suicides. Nowhere does Goodwin compare the
honor killing and suicide statistics for Turkey before and after Turkey’s bid for
EU accession was accepted. It is impossible to link honor suicides to EU
influence or the revised Penal Code based solely on this set of insufficient data.
Furthermore, author Aybige Yilmaz called the causation theory into
question when she announced that “between 1995 and 2000 the total number
of reported people committing suicide and attempting suicide in [Batman] was
191, and seventy-five percent of these were women, a figure well above the
world average.”277 This data implies the existence of a high female suicide rate
in Turkey long before the state government “cracked down” on honor killings
through Penal Code amendments. Moreover, the timeframe examined in this
article was substantially confined to the period before the EU accepted
Turkey’s membership bid in late 1999. The logical realization from this article
and its accompanying data is that honor suicides are more strongly connected
with the honor-shame complex and honor culture than with EU pressure and
legal reforms: “Indeed, there seems to be an insidious link, especially in the
east and south-eastern Turkey, between the unexpectedly high numbers of
suicides of young women/girls, and the suffocating honour codes they are
expected to live under.”278 Given the time periods analyzed in the abovementioned articles, the only constant variable contributing to honor suicides is
the underlying patriarchal emphasis on honor within Turkish society. This
connection between suicides and honor culture has been insufficiently explored
by scholars to date,279 and remains off their radar due to the use of the revised
Penal Code as a simplified scapegoat.
An examination of compiled suicide statistics from the Kurdish Human
Rights Project reinforces the argument that honor suicides are more closely
associated with the underlying honor-shame complex than with EU pressure
and Turkish legal revisions. In Van, a southeastern province of Turkey, the
Kurdish Human Rights Project reported the following suicide statistics from
2000 to 2006:280
277 Aybige Yilmaz, Victims, Villains and Guardian Angels—Batman Suicide Stories, 1 WESTMINSTER
PAPERS COMM. & CULTURE 66, 67 (2004), http://www.westminster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/20220/
006WPCC-Vol1-No1-Aybige_Yilmaz.pdf.
278 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 161.
279 Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 129 (“The reasons for such suicides—their potential links to pressures
having to do with family honor, to the effects of the armed conflict between Kurdish guerillas and the Turkish
army, or to the economic situation—have not been sufficiently explored.”).
280 KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, EUR. PARLIAMENT’S COMM. WOMEN’S
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15 suicides
27 suicides
17 suicides
12 suicides
11 suicides
11 suicides
21 suicides

According to the report, the highest rate of suicide was in 2001, three years
before the revised Penal Code was adopted. Although the suicide rate
decreased from 2002 to 2005 and subsequently increased in 2006, this data
cannot be used to persuasively argue that honor suicides came into existence
because of the revised Penal Code. In fact, the revised Penal Code was adopted
in 2004, yet the suicide statistics for both 2004 and 2005 are lower than their
pre-revision counterparts. Although the suicide rate increased in 2006, it is
unclear how and if the revised Penal Code had anything to do with it. There is
simply insufficient data to conclude that the revised Penal Code caused the
metamorphosis of honor killings into honor suicides.
Additionally, the report details honor suicides in Batman, which has
become known as the “suicide city.” The Insan Haklari Derneği (“IHD”)
collected suicide statistics from press reports and news articles to estimate the
approximate number of suicides in Batman on an annual basis.281 The
organization discovered that honor suicides were not reported in the press until
between 1997 and 1998, and could not collect data on suicides before that
time.282 However, beginning with the year 1999, IHD documented the number
of reported suicides or attempted suicides in the press as follows:283
1999:
2000:
2001:
2002:
2003:
2004:
2005:

53 suicides or attempted suicides (36 of these victims were female)
44 suicides or attempted suicides (26 of these victims were female)
79 suicides or attempted suicides (52 of these victims were female)
68 suicides or attempted suicides (53 of these victims were female)
23 suicides or attempted suicides (13 of these victims were female)
19 suicides or attempted suicides (8 of these victims were female)
25 suicides or attempted suicides (16 of these victims were female)

RIGHTS AND GEND. EQUAL., THE INCREASE IN KURDISH WOMEN COMMITTING SUICIDE 38 (June 2007),
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/393248/IPOL-FEMM_ET(2007)
393248_EN.pdf.
281 Id. at 41.
282 Id.
283 Id.
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2006: 33 suicides or attempted suicides (24 of these victims were female)
The Bar Association in Batman offered similar statistics for the years 1999 and
2000, claiming that there were fifty-three suicides in 1999 and of these, thirtythree victims were women.284 In 2000, the Bar Association reported fifty-seven
suicides with thirty-eight female victims.285 These data sets for Batman suggest
that the highest rate of suicide occurred in 2001, which was after the EU
accepted Turkey’s bid for membership but several years before the adoption of
the new Penal Code. The years 1999 and 2000 also witnessed significantly
higher rates of female suicide than the post-revision years of 2005 and 2006.
Aysan Sev’er called the suicide rate for Batman in 2000 “an unprecedented
anomaly” and noted that the suicide rate for women jumped to 9.9/100,000.286
This data even refutes the argument that honor suicides have dramatically
increased after the legal revisions were implemented. Thus, the causal link
between honor suicides and the revised Turkish Penal Code is unsubstantiated
by the data.
Furthermore, investigation into the motive of the suicide is extraordinarily
difficult when the victim does not survive. Families that force a female to take
her own life or stage the homicide as a suicide do not typically confess to the
crime, particularly if their motive is to avoid imprisonment.287 There is a strong
possibility that reporters overestimate the number of forced suicides by simply
assuming that all female suicides are honor killing substitutes. It is impossible
to know how many suicide victims were forced to kill themselves versus the
number of women that committed suicide for other reasons. For example, a
study conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute found that only 9.1% of
attempted female suicides were due to “family incompatibility.”288 The
implication from this study is that 90.9% of suicides were the result of nonfamily influence. This lack of conclusive evidence that suicides are honorrelated prevented the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women,
Yakin Erturk, from concluding that the suicides in southeastern Turkey were
actually disguised honor killings. According to Erturk, “[n]ational and
international media have speculated whether suicides of women and girls are in

284

Id.
Id.
286 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 170.
287 See id., at 181.
288 Suicide Statistics, 2012, TURKISH STATISTICS INST. (June 20, 2013), http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/
PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=15853.
285
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reality disguised honour killings or forced suicides. For many of the cases
reported to me, these speculations probably do not hold true.”289
Thus, the blanket claim by reporters and scholars that honor killings have
transformed into honor suicides as a direct consequence of the revised Penal
Code lacks evidentiary support. The statistics and data provided by both
governmental institutions and popular news media fail to separate pre- and
post-revision suicides and do not account for how any alleged increase in
suicides is directly linked to a decrease in honor killings. There have been no
studies conducted analyzing the rates of suicide and honor killings over the
years leading up to the Penal Code revisions and the years following its
adoption. The data, as it currently stands, is too tenuous to support the causal
connection that scholars and researchers espouse. Rather, it is more likely that
the suicides are intertwined with the underlying systems of honor and shame
that dominate certain aspects of society, and the alleged increase in honor
suicides is due to persistent media attention.
V. THE NECESSITY OF COMMUNITY DISCOURSE FOR HONOR CRIME
ERADICATION
Although the connection between honor suicides and the revised Penal
Code is likely not one of causation, the fact remains that the revised Penal
Code has failed to effectively eliminate honor crimes within Turkey’s borders.
Regardless of form, honor crimes exist within Turkey—and worldwide—at an
unacceptable rate, and top-down legal reformation has failed to sufficiently
mitigate the crime. In light of the fact that both honor killings and honor
suicides still exist almost ten years after adoption of the Penal Code revisions,
it is time to acknowledge that legal amendments and judicial overhaul are
insufficient by themselves to eradicate honor crimes. Rather, for the revised
Code to acquire legitimacy and command obedience, community perceptions
of honor and honor crimes must change from the ground up. This section
advocates for implementation of community discourse programs throughout
the Turkish state in order to effectively undermine the honor-shame complex
that fuels these murders.

289 Press Release, United Nations, supra note 269; see UN Urges Turkey to Probe Claims of Forced
Suicide Among Women, KURD NET (May 1, 2006), http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2006/6/
turkeykurdistan714.htm (“[Yakin] Erturk explained that many of the suicide cases reported to her in the
provinces of Batman, Sanliurfa and Van did not appear to be suspicious.”).
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A. The Failure of Legal Revisions
The revisions to the Turkish Penal Code, while commendable and
necessary, have failed to mitigate and combat both honor killings and honor
suicides in any appreciable manner. Although the revised Penal Code offers no
place for discrimination against women, many females nonetheless experience
horrible deaths at the hands of their family members.290 “Like a wounded
dinosaur, the patriarchal strongholds are extracting a few more victims in the
hope of preserving the status quo,” and family members are undeterred by the
possibility of legal sanctions.291 The legal equality of the sexes has done little
to end honor violence against women.292 Thus, while the Penal Code may have
changed and strengthened overnight, feudal patriarchal values are not so
adaptable.293
One reason for the inefficiency of the Penal Code in combating honor
crimes is that women must still file a complaint to receive legal protection.
This requirement keeps “many of the new provisions [of the Penal Code] out
of reach for victims.”294 This is particularly true in the southeastern provinces
of the country, where the literacy rate is frighteningly low.295 Additionally, the
complicity of both the state and police deter numerous victims from seeking
legal protection. Turkish police have been known to “openly side with the
perpetrators” and are reluctant to follow up on complaints of honor crimes.296
Women who do seek help are frequently told to return to their husbands, and
are denied protection if their situation is not grave enough.297 Moreover, there
is little differentiation among the police between accidents and suicides, and
the ability to bribe a Turkish police officer is not a foreign concept.298 Even if a
woman is able to acquire police protection, family members have traditionally
been able to use the legal and law enforcement systems to locate the female in
hiding and bring her home to face “justice.”299

290

Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 988.
Id.
292 Mojab & Hassanpour, supra note 47, at 85.
293 See Arin, supra note 50, at 823 (“Customary murders persist where feudal patriarchal values remain
and such ideology cannot be changed overnight.”).
294 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 183.
295 POPE, supra note 57, at 41 (noting that the illiteracy rate in the eastern and southeastern provinces of
Turkey is over forty percent).
296 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 186.
297 Id. at 187.
298 See id. at 186.
299 Id. at 187.
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Furthermore, the discriminatory attitudes of public officials have caused
familial violence to be perceived as a “fact of life” in the Kurdish dominated
southeast.300 A majority of police, gendarme, lawyers, judges, and legislators
within the country are disproportionately male, and may continue to harbor
stereotypical beliefs about Kurdish culture.301 Public officials, schools, and
police “have been reluctant to become involved in what they tend to see as
family disputes,” even after the adoption of the revised Penal Code.302 Thus,
while the legal code itself may have changed, the frontline response to reports
of honor crimes—police intervention and investigation—has been historically
abysmal.303
It is for these reasons that a narrow legal approach unaccompanied by
broader cultural initiatives is ineffective at reducing and eliminating honor
crimes within Turkey. There must be a “recognition that law-based strategies
alone are not enough, and that there is a need for other interventions.”304
Proposed legislation and implemented revisions that punish perpetrators are
too reactive and arrive too late to the party.305 By the time law is invoked, there
is often a corpse, not a frightened victim. Therefore, effective eradication of
honor crimes must employ a proactive strategy that addresses the underlying
frameworks of patriarchy and honor that give rise to these killings and
suicides. It is time to recognize that the law is not enough.
B. Community Discourse: Why Muslim Women can Slay Their Own Dragons
The unparalleled fascination of “Western” culture with the “spectacularly
oppressive practices” of Turkey and the Middle East has resulted in
tremendous international pressure to address global human rights violations.306
“Western” feminists have mobilized around issues of domestic violence and
murder primarily affecting Muslim women.307 These activists operate from the
assumption that the values of freedom and choice are universal and should be
achieved in every community.308 From this dialogue, a category of “pulp
nonfiction” is created in which “Western” nations must continuously save
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308

Kuraner, supra note 65, at 29.
Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 971.
ONAL, supra note 24, at 15.
See Prochazka, supra note 49, at 480.
Coomaraswamy, supra note 38, at xiii.
ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 109, at 131.
Id. at 7.
Id.
See id. at 17.
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Muslim women.309 The intricate complexities of honor crimes are “simplified
to fit a narrative of progress in which downtrodden Muslim women [are] given
new lives by enlightened ‘saviors’ who rescue[] them from ‘savages.’”310 In
direct response to this rhetoric, international organizations impose constant
pressure on the Middle East to increase honor crime punishments and “crack
down” on perpetrators.
This interaction, however, between the Middle East (specifically Turkey)
and its international allies obscures the social realities of honor crimes, and
results in untenable solutions. Women’s experiences are shaped differently
based on their geographic location, class position, and religious beliefs.311 A
“one-size-fits-all” approach is both arrogant and catastrophic. Without
understanding the societal fabric upon which honor crimes occur, it is
impossible to propose a workable solution to these human rights violations.
“Western” organizations that apply pressure on these communities to
“modernize” and eradicate honor crimes do so by advocating “Western”
solutions. Not only does this imply moral superiority on the part of the “West,”
but it also encourages gender and cultural subordination on an international
scale.312
When faced with “Western” pressure to combat honor crimes, Turkey and
similar countries adopt resolutions that modernize their state institutions,
infrastructure, legal codes, and legislative processes. Unfortunately, these
actions, encouraged by the international community, do not substantially
further their cause.313 As seen with the revised Turkish Penal Code, top-down
reformations cannot change the underlying patriarchal and honor structures of
society.314 In fact, the same state officials and local elites who propose these
top-down measures are themselves products of the same culture that produces
honor crimes.315 Rather, the solution must start from the ground up, beginning
with community discourse.

309 Id. at 79, 126; see also SHERENE H. RAZACK, CASTING OUT: THE EVICTION OF MUSLIMS FROM
WESTERN LAW & POLITICS 17 (2008).
310 ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 109, at 14.
311 Id. at 12.
312 See Ince et al., supra note 16, at 537 (“By preserving the subordination of women, the modernization
process has a responsibility for the persistence of customary killings in [Turkey].”).
313 Id. at 539 (“New social and legislative regulations, enforced thanks to the policies of developing
feminist and egalitarian groups, do represent steps towards a resolution of the problem but these are
unfortunately far from adequate.”) (emphasis added).
314 See SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 303.
315 Kirti et al., supra note 50, at 350.
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The term community discourse denotes “discussion of all aspect of ‘crimes
of honour’ within the community” where they occur.316 This strategy is
premised on the view that the state is complicit in honor crimes, and that
reliance on external pressure to eliminate honor killings and suicides is a form
of cultural imperialism.317 Community discourse works as a local solution to
help transform family and community attitudes towards honor crimes. As a
proactive attempt to change the patriarchal structures that support these
killings, community discourse generates and sustains a local dialogue aimed at
redefining the concept of honor.318 “The goal of this community discourse
should be to change the normative meaning of the communications
surrounding the possession of honor property.”319 Because the notion of honor
is so deeply imbedded in Turkish culture, the traditional “Western” human
rights framework ineffectively treats perpetrators as criminals rather than
perceiving them as victims of their own cultural masculinity. Thus, an effective
solution for honor crimes must alter the very social fabric that legitimizes the
crimes in the first place. A purely reactive, legal approach is useless where
honor crimes are the norm, not the exception.320
One of the most prominent examples of successful community discourse in
Turkey is the women’s organization KA-MER. Located in Turkey’s
southeastern province of Diyarbakir, KA-MER strives to address the problem
of honor killings before the executions occur through direct interaction with
the family councils.321 According to Leyla Pervizat, an activist at KA-MER:
We try to give men what I call cultural and psychological space
where their masculinity is not challenged and they do not feel forced
to kill in order to cleanse their honor. To do this, and in order to help
create space for long-term change, we take advantage of some of the
positive aspects of Turkish culture that offer individual men an
excuse to avoid violence. These include special occasions and
gatherings where nonviolent negotiations are encouraged or where
authority figures can act as intermediaries, in which we can make use
of traditions of hospitality toward guests or respect for elderly
people’s recommendations as tools to prevent these crimes.322
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With an approximate two month window between when a killing is ordered
and when it takes place, KA-MER has ample time to discuss the motivations
for murder with the victim’s family and find a less violent solution.323 The
most respected members of KA-MER visit the patriarchs and humbly ask them
to reverse honor killing decrees by reminding them of honor outside the sexual
context.324 In this way, the conception of honor is actually used to combat
honor crimes in a culturally sensitive manner. Because activists at KA-MER
have an understanding of the tribal and clan structures of the southeastern
provinces, they can succeed at “building gendered bridges, in a land that is
fractured by land-ownership patterns and ethnic conflict.”325 This internal
approach to honor killings exposes the patriarchs to women’s views on honor
crimes in a respectful and non-threatening interaction that does not involve the
courts or law. Thus, rather than trying to dismantle the honor structure from the
outside in, KA-MER employs a localized strategy that does not require the
“West” to save Muslim women. Muslim women themselves are leading a more
successful campaign against honor crimes from within their own borders.
The success of KA-MER’s program is undeniable. The number of women
applying to KA-MER has increased each year, totaling 750 applicants between
2003 and 2010.326 Of these 750 applicants, 414 received assistance from the
organization, and only three women died.327 Even the police have started to
regularly consult KA-MER in honor-related complaints, and have referred
women to the organization for assistance.328 In this manner, KA-MER
stimulates a communal dialogue that emphasizes the positive functions of
honor without imposing a stereotypical “Western” solution. Therefore, KAMER attempts to disassociate the concept of honor from women’s bodies and
create neutral spaces in which family and community attitudes towards these
crimes can be transformed.
If the brutality of honor crimes is to be stopped, then “Western” and
international organizations must begin working with the victims and women in
these cultures instead of working for them. Because culture informs and
323
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constructs both our identities and our experiences, it is impossible to combat
patriarchal femicide without first understanding the environment in which it is
created.329 It is for this reason that the proposed solutions must have the
cooperation of the community in order to thrive.330 Furthermore, including
community discourse in the honor crime solution is necessary out of respect
for the autonomy of families within those communities.331 It is time for the
solutions to femicide and honor killings to originate within the cultural
framework itself rather than from external pressure to modernize and
criminalize the perpetrators.332 Foreign intervention is no longer necessary to
“save” Muslim women—these women are powerful enough to save
themselves. Thus, the international community should devote resources to
fostering local community discourse through agencies such as KA-MER and
should avoid advocating one-size-fits-all “Westernized” solutions.
CONCLUSION
In the context of Turkish honor killings, the collision between cultural
norms and textual law appears like clashing waves in the sea. Pitting
patriarchal values against top-down modernization, the Turkish state has thrust
honor killings to the forefront of a political battle over women’s bodies. On the
one hand, women’s bodies “are seen as the battlegrounds for men’s struggles
to assert and reclaim their masculinity,”333 and on the other, the female figure
is perceived as a marker of modernity. The tension between these two extremes
has produced sensationalized literature on honor crimes, and has resulted in the
ethnicization of murder.
Particularly, the “Western” association of honor killings with the Islamic
faith has constructed Muslim women as passive victims “bound by the
unbreakable chains of religious and patriarchal oppression.”334 Whereas
“Western” women are deceptively liberated, Muslim women are portrayed as
slaves to patriarchal rules and gender constraints.335 In this manner, the image
329 See RAZACK, supra note 309, at 137 (“Until we can actually see Muslim communities in all their
complexities, we have little chance of making theses spaces less violent.”).
330 Kirti et al., supra note 50, at 351.
331 Id.
332 See RAZACK, supra note 309, at 129 (explaining that “legal solutions have to be crafted with Muslim
communities in mind. That is, they have to address the cultural context of the crime”).
333 Pervizat, In the Name of Honor, supra note 244.
334 Christina Scharff, Disarticulating Feminism: Individualization, Neoliberalism and the Othering of
‘Muslim Women’, 18 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 119, 127–28 (2011).
335 Id. at 128–30.
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of the oppressed Muslim woman ensures a stabilized theme of “Western”
superiority and dominance.
As the forerunner for modernization, the “West” has waged an international
war on cultural forms of femicide that are labeled as backward, barbaric, and
primitive.336 Honor killings in particular have been singled out for their
cultural uniqueness and targeted by the international community as threats to
modernization. Faced with both international and EU pressure to eradicate
honor crimes in order to foster accession negotiations, Turkey has engaged in
its own “othering” of the crime to disassociate itself from these “cultural”
killings. Specifically, Turkey has adopted its own ethnicization of murder to
marginalize an already disadvantaged minority group—the Kurds. By isolating
the Kurds, Turkey positions itself closer to the “West” on the modernization
spectrum, and uses honor killings as a mask for forced assimilation programs
against the Kurds. In this manner, Turkey strips the Kurdish culture of its
moral values and complexity, and ignores the role that state institutions play in
perpetuating violence.
Although comprehending honor killings from an ethno-cultural and
regional perspective is exceedingly restrictive, Turkey nonetheless targeted
Kurdish honor killing perpetrators through top-down legal reformation. By
“cracking down” on the leniency previously granted to perpetrators, Turkey
modernized its Penal Code to impose harsher punishments for honor crimes.
These legal revisions, however, led scholars and reporters to claim that honor
killings had simply transformed into honor suicides.
As this Article has shown, the causal link between honor suicides and the
revised Turkish Penal Code is tenuous at best and likely nonexistent.337 The
statistical data does not support this linkage, but rather undermines its strength.
Without clear pre- and post-revision statistics, it is impossible to compare
honor killing and honor suicide frequency within the necessary timeframes.
Instead, given the data currently available, it is much more likely that honor
suicides are connected with the underlying patriarchal structures that fuel
honor killings. Regardless of what caused the emergence of these suicides, it
remains clear that the revised Penal Code has failed to appreciably reduce
honor crimes throughout Turkey.
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Rather than implementing a doomed top-down legal approach to honor
crimes, the most effective solution lies in the strategy of community discourse.
While the law may change overnight, the underlying cultural and patriarchal
values that fuel societal morality are not so easily altered. In order to
delegitimize the conception of honor as property concealed within the female
body, there must be “active and sustained discursive engagement with local
communities.”338 Women must be provided the tools to undermine these
structures from within, and there is no place for allegedly superior
“Westernized” solutions. Honor crimes cannot be stopped without directly
understanding the cultural environment in which they were first created. It is
only by evolving culture from within that honor crimes can truly be
eliminated.339
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